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A steady drug supply from Mexico is prevalent within the U.S. today, and even when 
large drug seizures remove drugs from the supply chain, little significance of that reduced 
supply is seen on the street.  Instead, based on little to no change in the drug supply, drug 
traffickers quickly adapt and overcome the barriers in place so they can ensure their 
clients continue to receive their supplies while profits are returned to Mexico. However, 
sustained success from illicit activities is challenging, but the Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) continue to adapt and innovate in an effort to stay ahead of federal 
authorities.  But what kind of strategies do they use that afford them such resilience when 
faced with policies and law enforcement designed to make them extinct?  This thesis, 
through an analysis of the core activities of drug trafficking and money laundering, will 
attempt to answer the question: what are the effective business practices used by the 
Mexican drug cartels? 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, Forbes named Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, 
leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel, to its “World’s Billionaires List.”1  Although this 
finding is highly controversial, especially when taking into account profits made in the 
deviant world, it symbolizes the huge profits that can accompany running a successful 
drug cartel.2  Despite billions spent by the United States and Mexico to fight the Mexican 
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), efforts have not quelled these multinational 
enterprises from continuing to succeed by supplying the black markets with products and 
services that return extremely high profit margins.  For example, if the Sinaloa DTO has 
its hand in a kilo of cocaine from production all the way until it is sold in grams in a U.S. 
market, it will earn revenues upwards of $100,000 on a product for which it originally 
only paid about $2,000.  The lucrative activity of drug trafficking produces revenues of 
$6.6 billion to $39 billion per year, a dollar amount that pushes cartels to streamline their 
strategies and business models so that they can play a part in earning some of these 
profits.3 
With such an enticing financial reward at stake, it seems as if more organizations 
and people would attempt to enter the drug trade.  However, the Mexican drug cartels are 
territorial in the sense that they want to control the smuggling routes, because controlling 
the routes means they have a say of who and what passes through, and with that power 
comes profits.  Additionally, drug trafficking is one of many illicit activities that make up 
the business of a drug cartel; cartels are involved in numerous activities that directly and 
indirectly help produce revenues.  With an infrastructure in place that facilitates the drug 
trade, the cartels will overlap some of their supporting activities to ensure the success of 
                                                 
1 Erin Carlyle, “Billionaire Druglords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers,” 
Forbes, March 13, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-
chapo-guzman-pablo-escobar-the-ochoa-brothers/. 
2 Patrick R. Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” New York Times, June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com. 
3 Ibid. 
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other revenue producing activities, such as human smuggling, which brings in upwards of 
$6 billion annually, or the core activity of money laundering, which plays a crucial role in 
the overall business by returning profits from the northern flow of illicit goods.4  Other 
activities involve more supportive roles, such as bribery, kidnapping, and enforcement, 
which help prevent disruptions in the flow of goods both north and south by either paying 
off pertinent contacts or killing and torturing those who stand in the way.  But the big 
picture emerges when these activities are combined to produce the business of a Mexican 
drug cartel.  
Although the specific strategies and business models that are applied to the 
various drug cartel activities are not formally known, an examination of their core 
activities through a pattern of behavior can shed light on how these cartels run their 
business.  An analogy to this type of approach would be how business analysts evaluate 
and predict behavior from companies such as Apple and Google.  The Wall Street 
Journal might feature a story about the soon-to-be-released Apple iPhone or Google 
Glasses, but that analyst most likely has never stepped foot inside the company, let alone 
the boardroom.  Instead, the writer’s examination is based on studying the past behavior 
of Apple and Google from an established perspective, such as previous release dates of 
the iPhone or changes in supporting platforms such as iTunes.  Through this type of 
analysis, which breaks down the individual activities through an established framework, a 
firmer grasp on how a company operates emerges.  This framework is not just limited to 
predicting future products and activities, but also presents the ability for researchers to 
analyze a specific company’s effective business practices.  Thus, when examining the 
past behavior of Mexican DTOs, their proven success of supporting and operating illicit 
actives that produce significant profit margins can be realized. 
A steady drug supply from Mexico is prevalent within the U.S. today, and even 
when large drug seizures remove drugs from the supply chain, little significance of that 
                                                 
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug 
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime (2011), 21, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2010), 66, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html. 
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reduced supply is seen on the street.  Instead, based on little to no change in the drug 
supply, drug traffickers quickly adapt and overcome the barriers in place so they can 
ensure their clients continue to receive their supplies.5  However, sustained success from 
illicit activities is challenging, but the Mexican drug cartels continue to adapt and 
innovate in an effort to stay ahead of federal authorities.  But what kind of strategies do 
they use that afford them such resilience when faced with policies and law enforcement 
designed to make them extinct?  This thesis, through an analysis of the core activities of 
drug trafficking and money laundering, will attempt to answer the question: what are the 
effective business practices used by the Mexican drug cartels? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
In 2009, the Department of Justice declared that Mexican DTOs were “the 
greatest organized crime threat to the United States.”6  These organizations, fueled by 
profit, are involved in numerous activities that span across the U.S. – Mexican border and 
are willing to kill anyone that stands in their way of making money.  Even with efforts 
from both countries to disrupt their activities, these cartels have continued to successfully 
move drugs through Mexico and into the U.S., and have even infiltrated the U.S. through 
contracts with other organizations and gangs.7 
In the wake of the decline of Columbian drug cartels, Mexican DTOs emerged to 
fill their void and became leaders in drug trade with the U.S.  For example, studies show 
that 95 percent of the cocaine consumed in the U.S. travels across the U.S.–Mexican 
border, plus the cartels are involved in the distribution of most other drugs consumed in 
the U.S., from marijuana to methamphetamine.8  Within this illicit economy, the drug 
                                                 
5 Thomas Rowe, Federal Narcotics Law and the War on Drugs: Money Down a Rat Hole (New York: 
Haworth Press, 2006), 34; Peter Reuter, “The Limits of Supply-Side Drug Control,” Milken Institute 
Review, First Quarter 2001, 22, http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2001_3/14–23mr9.pdf; 
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Federal Domestic Illegal Drug Enforcement 
Efforts: Are They Working?, by Celinda Franco, CRS Report R40732 (Washington, DC: Office of 
congressional Information and Publishing, January 27, 2010), 21. 
6 National Drug Intelligence Center, “2009 National Drug Threat Assessment,” III. 
7 National Drug Intelligence Center, “2011 National Drug Threat Assessment,” 1. 
8 Christopher Paul, Agnes G. Schaefer, and Colin P. Carke, “The Challenge of Violent Drug-
Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on 
Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform,” RAND 2011, 2–3. 
 4 
trade is known for its extremely high revenues, but it is the control of the supply routes 
that is at the core of those profits.  For example, following the value chain of Cocaine 
from the Andean region all the way to the U.S., a kilo of cocaine jumps in value by about 
50% simply by moving it across the U.S. border.9  This significant value addition at the 
border pushes cartels to entice contractors to accept high personal risk in exchange for 
money or drugs.  If met with failure, the individuals involved could find themselves 
facing torture and death or imprisonment, but if successful, the money made as a drug 
smuggler can offer a better life.10  Thus, with the extremes that success and failure bring, 
those involved in illicit activities will push themselves to overcome any obstacle that 
stands in their way.  This perseverance leads to innovative ideas and products that 
circumvent government policies, and it also gives people the capacity to commit ruthless 
acts of violence against anyone that stands in their way.  Cartels are known for their 
extreme and public violence, at times even using terrorist style tactics by striking with 
heavy and brutal force, but only when it warrants protecting their business interests.11 
DTOs also protect themselves through an organizational structure that adds layers 
of secrecy to individual activities and the business as a whole.  Using a model that 
includes a copious amount of contractors and subcontractors, the cartels have become 
“multi-nodal” by using numerous independent cells that place the personal risk on the 
contractor and compartmentalize information.12  They often rely on these networks of 
contactors and subcontractors to “expand and retract according to market opportunities 
and regulatory constraints.”13  Thus, when the news touts the successful capture of a drug 
cartel member, it fails to uncover the reality that the person captured is most likely just a 
                                                 
9 Scott Stewart, “Mexico’s Cartels and the Economics of Cocaine,” Stratfor, January 3, 2013, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-cartels-and-economics-cocaine. 
10 Campbell, Drug War Zone, 65. 
11 Terry Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” Immigration 
Policy Center, February 2012, 3, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-
three-part-series. 
12 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking 
Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel, CRS Report R41576 
(Washington, DC: Office of congressional Information and Publishing, September 7, 2011), 24. 
13 Michael Kenney, “The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organization in the 
Colombian Cocaine Trade,” Global Crime 8, no. 3 (2007): 235, doi.org/10.1080/17440570701507794. 
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contractor who knows little about the organization for which he or she is working.  
Although good for the agency that seized the drugs and captured the individual, it “is by 
no means a blow to the criminal effort.”14  This level of resilience that drug cartels are 
able to exhibit through their organizational structure makes them nearly unstoppable.15  
However, from the perspective of the cartels, their motives are purely monetary, and thus 
their focus is on activities that directly and indirectly produce revenue.  For instance, the 
DTOs are not interested in taking over the Mexican government or running the country, 
but instead want an uninterrupted supply chain of illicit goods into and out of the United 
States and are willing to do whatever it takes to control those routes.16 
Mexican drug cartels continue to move illicit products north and return profits 
south despite the ever-changing battlefield controlled by rival cartels and government 
officials.  They are entrepreneurs, and more specifically, arbitrageurs, in the sense that 
they seek out ways to establish themselves in a black market economy that demands their 
products and services, and then reach into their established infrastructure within Mexico 
and the U.S. to find the most efficient ways to bring those products and services to their 
clients.17  These illicit activities go beyond drug trafficking; Mexican cartels are also 
involved in activities such as human smuggling, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, money 
laundering, bribery, and extortion.18  Additionally, the huge value addition to a product 
                                                 
14 Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” 7. 
15 Organizational resilience is defined as “the capacity [of an organization] to withstand challenges to 
the social fabric” and thus still be able to execute “interrelated and coordinated activities between its 
members and organization subunits during and after a crisis.”  This definition is derived from Edward H. 
Powley, “Underlying Social Mechanisms of Organizational Resilience: The Role of Connective Capacity,” 
in “Organizational Resilience: A Social Mechanisms Perspective,” eds. Michelle Barton and Marlys 
Christianson, 32. 
16 Robert Culp, “Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations,” Small Wars Journal (2011): 2. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/strategy-for-military-counter-drug-operations. 
17 Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations, 3. An entrepreneurial role in an arbitrage sense is defined 
as an entrepreneur who discovers an opportunity in a different market that takes advantage of the price 
differentiation. In this case, the entrepreneur does not always physically produce the goods being sold, but 
instead creates additional profits by taking advantage of market opportunities that others have not noticed. 
This definition is derived from Israel M. Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies in the 
Theory of Entrepreneurship (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 214–215. 
18 Christopher Paul, Agnes G. Schaefer, and Colin P. Clarke, The Challenge of Violent Drug-
Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing Rand Research on Urban 
Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform (Santa Monica: Rand, 2011), ix, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125. 
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once it moves across the border continues to spur new innovations and ideas that are 
essential for survival and profitability “in the context of a deadly, non regulated and 
highly competitive environment.”19  Thus studying their effective business practices will 
hopefully bring about new policy recommendations that will disrupt the success that 
Mexican DTOs currently reap.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In order to analyze the Mexican DTOs in the context of their effective business 
practices, this project must first establish a framework for analysis that can provide a 
standardized lens for studying their core business activities: drug trafficking and money 
laundering.  However, to create this analytical framework, a study of business models 
will need to be presented, to include a literature review and examples of how an analysis 
is conducted.  As previously mentioned, it is impossible to access any drug cartel’s 
formal or informal strategy or business model because of the limited first hand sources in 
black market economies.  So, to overcome this obstacle, this thesis will study the known 
practices of the drug cartels by examining two key illicit activities that, when combined, 
encompass a significant portion of the drug cartel business: drug trafficking as an 
example of an activity that involves the northern flow of illicit goods, along with the 
activities that indirectly support its success, and money laundering as a fundamental 
activity that completes the transaction by returning profits back to the cartel.  In order to 
overcome the barriers that exist when studying the informal economies, such as a lack of 
documentation or inability to access firsthand knowledge of a business, this researcher 
will examine the pattern of activities that have been uncovered from interdiction, 
confiscation, capture, and federal hearings.  At the conclusion of this thesis, the hope is to 
demonstrate that DTOs must be innovative in their approach to overcome law 
enforcement policy, especially when the consequences of failure result in death or 
incarceration.  It will also reveal that cartels operate a contracting model for almost all of 
their activities, which allows them to stay risk averse and reap the profits while 
                                                 
19 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “The Geopolitics of Clandestine Innovation in the Drug Business. A 
Framework of Analysis to Understand Adaptation Capacities of TCOs,” in The “New” Face of 
Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National 
Security, ed. Ben Riley and Kathleen Kieran (Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense: 2013), 152. 
 7 
contractors face the threat of being captured or killed.20  Although individual Mexican 
DTOs may exhibit different strategies while executing similar business activities, I 
propose that collectively there is a common thread of core business practices that all 
cartels poses in order to be successful.  To research these effective business practices, two 
hypothesizes are proposed that will lead to a more complete understanding of the 
strategies and business models used by Mexican DTOs. 
The first hypothesis is that Mexican DTOs must rely on innovative problem 
solving if they want to overcome policies in place designed to disrupt their activities.  If 
they fail to innovate and adapt, they will quickly find themselves up against the barriers 
set forth by law enforcement, which eventually lead to extinction.  Additionally, these 
innovations add value by providing more efficient ways to move illicit products across a 
controlled border or territory, and thus lead to even higher profit margins.  However, 
innovation does not necessarily mean that drug cartels are only relying on new 
technology and equipment, which although is an important aspect.  But they are also 
continuously solving a supply chain problem by moving illicit goods north and south 
through an ever-changing barrier of government policies and law enforcement.21  
In addition to innovation as a tool that leads to success in the deviant world, the 
second hypothesis adds that Mexican DTOs must demonstrate high-level degrees of 
organizational resilience if they want to survive in the deviant world and operate a highly 
profitable business.  To achieve this level of resiliency, DTOs have an organizational 
structure that protects the core of the cartel while multiple contractors and subcontractors 
accept the personal risk associated with its illicit activities.  These multiple cells often 
conduct simultaneous operations with very little knowledge about other contractors or the 
operation itself, which helps limit exposure should law enforcement or rival cartels 
                                                 
20 Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: Operational Assessment,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 1, 
2010, 62, doi.org/10.1080/09592310903561429; Mexican DTOs utilize performance based contracting, in 
which money is paid to contractors once a job is completed. This type of contracting gives a cartel 
flexibility to cut ties to its contractors if they get captured, killed, or no longer render themselves useful. 
This contracting model is derived from Robert D. Behn and Peter A. Kant, “Strategies for Avoiding the 
Pitfalls of Performance Contracting,” Public Productivity & Management Review 22, no. 4 (1999): 471. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3380931.  
21 Nieto-Gomez, “The Geopolitics of Clandestine Innovation in the Drug Business,” 153. 
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apprehend some of the contractors.  This organizational strategy also helps the DTOs 
keep their hands in multiple business activities and thus limit financial risk through 
minimized exposure.  These activities are capable of expanding and contracting based on 
the opportunities and constraints of the market, so they can maximize their profits while 
others assume the personal risk.22  Essentially, the DTOs provide an infrastructure for 
revenue producing business activities and subsidize contractors to meet the demands of 
its customers.23  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II will provide the framework of analysis 
for this project.  It will first establish and define a business model in the context of how it 
will be used throughout this thesis.  Included in this study will be an examination of some 
of the pertinent literature found on business models in the context of applying them to 
Mexican DTOs, from which the four-part analytical framework will be developed. 
Finally, it will apply that framework for analysis to two legitimate companies as an 
example of how a business can be analyzed through the four established lenses. 
Chapter III will apply the framework for analysis to the business activity of drug 
trafficking.  This researcher chose drug trafficking as an example of an activity that 
involves the northern flow of illicit goods because of its significant revenues and its ties 
with other supporting activities.  These supporting activities are also highlighted in this 
Chapter as a way to demonstrate the overlap and interconnectedness that exists in order to 
conduct successful operations. 
Chapter IV will build on the analysis conducted in Chapter III by applying the 
same analytical framework to the fundamental activity of money laundering.  This core 
activity is a vital part of all revenue-producing activities because it completes the 
                                                 
22 Michael Kenney, “The Architecture of Drug Trafficking,” 235–237. 
23 Referred to as a two-sided network, the DTOs provide an infrastructure that brings two groups 
together; one side, the contractors, is subsidized with money and drugs to attract enough participants, while 
the other side, the end users of the DTO products and services, is willing to pay top dollar to reach the 
subsidized group.  This concept is derived from Thomas Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker, and Marshall W. 
Van Alstyne, “Strategies for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review 84, no. 10 (2006): 93–96. 
Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 25, 2013). 
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business transaction by returning profits to the supporting drug cartel.  Additionally, 
certain aspects of this activity reflect the practices used for other illicit goods that flow 
south.  
Chapter V will summarize the findings of the analysis and demonstrate if either 
hypothesis is correct.  It will also make recommendations for future research and policies 
that could be used against the DTOs.  Finally, it will expand upon some of the research 
uncovered that is new to the field of drug trafficking. 
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II. ESTABLISHING A BUSINESS MODEL AS THE 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Business models are designed and implemented to help companies capture value, 
however, each type of business model stresses different keys to success.  At first glance, 
literature on business models seems to vary in both definition and description, but a 
closer look reveals that business models are designed to support specific activities or 
businesses within a company.  For instance, a company that sells goods over the Internet 
might utilize a business model that focuses on reduced overhead or expedient shipping, 
whereas a company that provides medical services might emphasize increased patient 
volume or afterhours care.  However, the Mexican drug cartels, as businesses, are 
involved in numerous illicit activities, from drug trafficking to money laundering, and 
trying to find a specific business model that can be applied across those different 
activities can be a challenge.  Additionally, because they operate in the deviant world, 
gaining inside access to why and how they make specific business decisions, such as why 
do they choose to smuggle drugs through a border checkpoint instead of the middle of the 
desert, is impossible.  But instead of trying to find the business model that drug cartels 
use, assuming they all used the same one, this thesis will establish a framework for 
analysis that can then be applied to their illicit activities, and from those lenses, their 
effective business practices can be extracted.   
This Chapter will set up the analytical framework that will be used to look at the 
Mexican drug cartels by first establishing a foundation by defining the elements of a 
business model.  Numerous definitions exist, but a common link can be found across all 
business model literature; business models are about helping a company add value to 
customers and produce revenue.24  Second, this Chapter will begin to carve out the 
framework of analysis that will be applied in this thesis by first presenting an example of 
a nine-part business model that can be applied to numerous types of businesses and 
activities.  Using the key components to this model, a four-lens business model will be 
                                                 
24 Joan Margretta, “Why business models matter,” Harvard Business Review 80, no. 5 (2002): 87. 
Business Source Complete (623782). 
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developed that places emphasis on the facets that are believed to be most relevant to drug 
cartel activities.  From this structure, the analytical framework for evaluating drug cartels 
will be presented, which will emphasize the value they provide to the customers, where 
they receive revenues and face expenditures, and what and how they use assets and 
activities to deliver and capture value.  This framework for analysis will provide the 
reader with a logical progression of how the study of business models can be used to 
better understand the behavior of drug cartels.  Money is the lifeblood of the cartels, and 
once an activity ceases to produce income, that cartel must reevaluate how to resolve that 
issue or face extinction. 
A. WHAT IS A BUSINESS MODEL?  
The business model concept has been around since the early days of barter and 
exchange, yet as the world has become more interconnected in the last two decades, 
business models have begun to play a more significant role in a company’s success.25  
For example, today, customers have easy access to information, products, and services 
from numerous companies simply by using the Internet or a smartphone, so businesses 
must constantly adapt and innovate in order to maintain their customers and “capture 
value from providing new products and services.”26  The guidance or outline a company 
can use to achieve success is often found in a business model, either formal or informal, 
but each one varies in what they stress as important.  A 2011 study found that over 1,200 
academic articles have been written about business models, yet none of them agree on 
what exactly a business model is.27 
The definitions of business models vary, but a fundamental theme amongst all of 
them is the emphasis of how a company makes money.28  Looking at these various 
                                                 
25 David J. Teece, “Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation,” Long Range Planning 43 
(2010): 174. 10.1016. 
26 Ibid., 172. 
27 Christoph Zott, Raphael Amit, and Lorenzo Massa, “The Business Model: Recent Developments 
and Future Research,” Journal of Management (May 2011): 1–3, doi.org.10.1177/014920631140625. 
28 Peter Weill et al., “Do Some Business Models Perform Better than Others?  A Study of the 1000 
Largest U.S. Firms,” MIT Sloan School of Management, working paper No. 226, 2004, 5, 
http://ccs.mit.edu/papers/pdf/wp226.pdf (accessed September 2012). 
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definitions brings two different aspects to light.  First, business models are about 
capturing value, which can be in reference to the customer’s desire in terms of a product 
he or she wants or in terms of revenue for the company.  For example, Amit and Zott 
define a business model as “the content, structure, and governance of transactions 
designed so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities.”29  
Their definition encompasses the framework needed to create and capture value, which is 
in line with Chesbrough and Rosenbloom’s definition: “The heuristic logic that connects 
technical potential with the realization of economic value.”30   
A significant part of this theme is that for a company to bring in revenue, the 
customer must be willing to pay for the goods or service being offered.  Income is vital to 
a company’s survival, so if the customer chooses to do business elsewhere, then the 
original company must have a mechanism in place to regain its customers by satisfying 
their needs.  This way of approaching a business is similar to Margretta’s viewpoint, that 
business models are a narrative of “stories that explain how enterprises work,” which in 
her view “answers Peter Drucker’s age-old questions: Who is the customer?  And what 
does the customer value?  It also answers the fundamental questions every manager must 
ask: How do we make money in this business?  What is the underlying economic logic 
that explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost?”31   
The second theme amongst these definitions is the reference to the system or 
structure in place to deliver that value.32  For example, Timmers defines business models 
as “an architecture of the product, service and information flows, including a description 
of the various business actors and their roles; a description of the potential benefits for 
                                                 
29 Raphael Amit and Christoph Zott, “Value Creation in E-Business,” Strategic Management Journal 
22 (2001): 511. 10.1002/smj.187. 
30 Henry Chesbrough and Richard S. Rosenbloom, “The Role of the Business Model in Capturing 
Value from Innovation: Evidence from Xerox Corporation’s Technology Spinoff Companies,” Industrial 
and Coporate Change 11, no. 3 (2002): 529. 
31 Joan Margretta, “Why business models matter,” 87. 
32 Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur, Business Model Generation (Hoboken: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2010). 
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the various business actors; a description of the sources of revenues.”33  In this sense, he 
sees a business model as an interconnected system that sustains the business unit, which 
is highly compatible with the way Johnson, Christensen, and Kagermann describe it as 
containing “four interlocking elements, that, taken together, create and deliver value.”34  
This infrastructure encompasses a wide range of activities from production to delivery, 
and from human assets to financial assets, which are all needed to make a business work, 
as highlighted in a different article by Zott and Amit: “A system of interdependent 
activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries.”35  By combining value 
creation and an infrastructure to deliver that value, companies ensure their success by 
making money, something that both legitimate and illicit companies need in order to 
exist.  
In the illicit world that the drug cartels operate, the same concepts of how value is 
created and captured can be applied.  Just as with legitimate companies, drug cartels must 
provide a product or service that customers value and have an infrastructure in place that 
can deliver that value.  Although meeting these two facets sounds simple, cartels must be 
adaptive in serving the needs of their customers and also in overcoming the obstacles in 
place from operating in the deviant world.  For example, the value might refer to the 
drugs that a distributor needs, or the service of smuggling a human into the United States.  
The structure would involve supporting activities such as enforcement, bribery, and 
extortion, along with assets such as the smuggling route, the smugglers, and their 
equipment.  Additionally, some customers might demand marijuana, whereas others 
prefer cocaine, but just because federal agents clamp down on illegal movements in the 
deserts of Arizona, these cartels must still figure out a way to deliver their products.  
Drugs and smuggling routes are just two basic examples of how a business model can be 
                                                 
33 Paul Timmers, “Business Models for Electronic Markets,” Electronic Markets, 8 (1998): 2. 
www.commerce.net.  
34 Mark W. Johnson, Clayton M. Christensen, and Henning Kagermann, “Reinventing Your Business 
Model,” Harvard Business Review 86, no. 12 (2008): 52. Business Source Complete (35386627). 
35 Christoph Zott and Raphael H. Amit, “Designing your Future Business Model: An Activity System 
Perspective,” IESE Business School Working Paper No. 781, 2009, 216. 
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applied to the drug cartel activities, but the following chapters will go more in depth on 
their illicit activities that involve both northern and southern flow. 
1. Business Model Literature 
Business models provide an outline that helps companies make money, but the 
previous section still presented a number of definitions from various sources.  The 
literature behind those definitions also varies, yet hinges on specific types of businesses.  
The following section will highlight some of the business model literature and draw a 
correlation as to its relevance to Mexican drug cartels.  
There are numerous types of businesses, from online retailers like Amazon, to 
physical retail stores like Target, to concierge travel services like Net Jets.  Each of these 
companies might be made up of several different activities that make up their entire 
business, and within each activity, the company would utilize a plan or strategy that 
places emphasis on different facets in order to be successful.  For example, Apple’s 
iPod/iTunes business model encompassed two main activities: provide customers with an 
easy way to browse, purchase, and listen to music, and provide record companies with a 
way to make revenue from sales in one of the worlds largest online music stores.36  Thus, 
Apple managed two separate activities, each with different customers, value, and 
infrastructure, in order to make up its iPod/ iTunes business model.  This is similar to the 
drug cartels that also manage multiple activities, such as drug trafficking as a way to 
make revenue, money laundering as a fundamental activity required to return those 
profits to Mexico, and enforcement and bribery as a support activity that helps hedge 
against disruption.  When combined, these activities bring together the bigger picture of 
the overall business of drug cartels, however, individually each activity involves its own 
strategy or business model that leads to success.  Thus, whether in the formal economy or 
the deviant world, literature on business models varies depending on the type of business 
into which it fits, but can be narrowed down to two broad categories as it pertains to this 
thesis: strategy, and technology and innovation.37  The literature pertaining to these two 
                                                 
36 Osterwalder, Business Model Generation, 47. 
37 Zott, “The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research,” 2, 17. 
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categories each stresses a different aspect of the business model in order to best deliver 
and capture value.  However, differentiating between the type of business or activity is an 
important aspect when choosing which business model to use.  
Business model strategy ties into the activities executed by drug cartels to deliver 
value to their customer.  This strategy focuses on the activities used to create and capture 
value, meaning that cartels must figure out how to best use their resources to deliver 
value to their customers in order to make a profit.38  Numerous types of actions are taken 
into account when using those resources, from the efficiency of activities to the novelty 
of the product being supplied, to the amount of teamwork involved.39  However, the main 
theme amongst business model strategy literature is how companies execute the delivery 
of their value.40    
Through innovation, a key component of the cartels’ business model must explain 
how they unlock the value potential of new ideas in the fast paced markets that deal with 
modern technology and law enforcement opposition.41 It can be seen as the “mechanism 
that connects a firm’s innovative technology” to the needs of the customer and the 
demands of the market.42  By being adaptive, companies, or drug cartels, can increase the 
value they provide to the customer while also taking in more profit by either using that 
new technology or innovating on their own.43   
The context behind why a certain business model is being described or 
recommended is helpful in application purposes so that the type of company in question 
can focus on the aspect of its business that brings them the most success.  For example, 
                                                 
38 Allan Afuah and Christopher L. Tucci, Internet Business Models and Strategies: Text and Cases 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 3. 
39 Zott, “The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research,” 11–12; Christoph Zott 
and Raphael Amit, “Business Model Design and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms,” 
Organizational Science 18, no. 2 (2007): 182–183. 10.1287/orsc.1060.0232. 
40 Zott, “The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research,” 11–14. 
41 Ibid., 14. 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 Rogerio C. Calia, Fabio M. Guerrini, and Gilnei L. Moura, “Innovation Networks: From 
Technological Development to Business Model Reconfiguration,” Technovation 27 (2007): 430–431. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/technovation. 
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Mexican drug cartels make money by relying on strong networks of isolated cells to 
conduct most of their activities and innovating and adapting to stay ahead of authorities 
and competitors.  Thus, when narrowing down the types of business models to use for 
analysis, this thesis will pull from literature relating to both strategy and technology and 
innovation in order to highlight drug cartel activities and their ability to capitalize on new 
ideas.  
B. BUSINESS MODEL EXAMPLE 
The following business model example both fits the criteria previously described 
and could be applied to the drug cartels; it is from the book, Business Model Generation, 
and outlines a building block approach that any company can use to implement a strategy 
that “creates, delivers, and captures value.”44  The researcher chose this model because of 
its adaptability and flexibility; it can fit just about any type of business, from banking 
companies to retail industries to software engineering firms, and provides the flexibility 
to emphasize different facets of its model to fit each type of company.  By providing a 
“canvas” from which to work, companies can carve out a logical path that any 
organization can use to make money.45  This section will explain the nine building blocks 
of this business model by grouping them in what the authors categorize as the four main 
areas of a business: customer, offer, infrastructure, and financial viability.46 
1. Customer 
Every type of business must have an understanding of who their customers are, 
how to reach them, and how to interact with them.  This portion of the business model is 
comprised of three blocks: customer segments, channels, and customer relationships.  
Customer segments identify who the customers are and the type of market in which they 
exist.  As customer markets vary, so will the structure of a particular company in order to 
service that market.  For example, in a mass market, a company like Wal-Mart will serve 
a large group “with broadly similar needs and problems,” but in a niche market, a 
                                                 
44 Osterwalder, Business Model Generation, 14. 
45 Ibid., 42. 
46 Ibid., 15. 
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company such as an airplane part manufacturer would cater to a specific requirement.47  
The rest of the business model revolves around its customer base, so it is important to 
have an understanding of the needs, behaviors, and other attributes of this group.48  With 
the identification of who the customer is, the next block identifies the channels used to 
communicate and deliver value to that customer.  These channels incorporate numerous 
phases, from awareness of a product to purchase and delivery to customer feedback, and 
they rely on access through mediums such as a company’s website or shared distribution 
centers.49  This link between the company and the customer must be managed, which 
brings in the final block: customer relationships.  Dependent on the business, these 
relationships vary from interacting on a personal level to a self-service that provides tools 
for customers to conduct business on their own.50  By managing these three segments, a 
company can set out to create an offer that the customer values, and in return will bring in 
revenue for the business. 
2. Offer 
Using the link established with the customer base, a company can then focus on 
what it is offering.  This portion of the business model is made up of only one block, 
value proposition, and refers to the product or service that is provided for the customer 
segment.  A simple way to think of the value proposition is that it is used to solve the 
customer’s problem, either by providing a quantitative result, such as providing a low 
price, or a qualitative value, such as a unique experience.  Value propositions come in 
many forms and depend on what a company provides that no one else can, especially 
when customers have multiple options from which to choose.51  Once the customer 
accepts the offer, a company can focus on how it creates, delivers, and captures value. 
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3. Infrastructure 
A company’s infrastructure provides the system to capture value, starting with the 
creation of a value proposition, its delivery to the customer, and finally returning money 
back to the company.  It is made up of three blocks: key activities, key resources, and key 
partnerships.  Key activities are the crucial part of a business model that refer to how a 
company creates and captures value and involves all of the processes to create and deliver 
a product.  These activities vary depending on the type of business, from managing 
supply chains to problem solving to training personnel.52  Companies rely on key 
activities to encompass how they capture value, but what it uses in that process also plays 
a vital role in its success.  Key resources refer to the assets needed for the key activities 
and, just like key activities, vary depending on the type of business.  For example, some 
businesses such as retailers rely on their buildings and manufacturing facilities, whereas 
others such as Silicon Valley startups rely on their intellectual and human resources.  
However, key resources do not correlate to ownership, but instead deal with access to the 
assets needed to be successful.53  That access is highlighted in key partnerships, which 
refer to the network of relationships that exist in a business.  Partnerships can exist 
between the buyer and the seller, but can also emerge during joint ventures or between 
competitors.  These relationships even allow a company to offset risks by relying on 
other sources for different aspects of its business.54  When integrated, these three blocks, 
key activities, resources, and partnerships, provide the structure vital to a company’s 
success.  Within the drug cartels, this infrastructure incorporates the tools members use to 
create value, how they create value, and the network of cells used to minimize risk.  
However, there is still one more aspect of the business model that every type of business 
must grasp in order to streamline their profits. 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 36–37. 
53 Ibid., 34–35. 
54 Ibid., 38–39. 
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4. The Financial Viability 
Regardless of who the customers are, what the value proposition is, or how value 
is captured, a company’s financial viability acts as its lifeblood by emphasizing the costs 
associated with running a business balanced with the amount of cash being generated.  
The first of two building blocks within this business model is cost structure, which 
“describes all costs incurred to operate” a company or business.55  Companies must 
evaluate their fixed and variable costs so that they understand the expenditures of day-to-
day functions and the cost of adding additional operations.  Besides understanding cost 
structure, companies may choose to modify certain actions to reduce expenses so that 
they can pass along lower costs to its customers, as is seen with Southwest Airlines.  
Other companies, such as luxury hotels, are not as concerned with reducing costs, but 
instead must know how much it spends so that it can pass those costs on to its 
customers.56  A company’s revenue stream is the final building block, and is balanced 
with cost structure by focusing on the inflow of cash from the customer.  Companies 
must figure out what a customer is willing to pay for the value he or she is being 
provided.  That payment can come as a one-time payment, such as when the customer is 
sold a physical product, or it can stream in through ongoing payments, such as a 
subscription fee for a service.  Companies can then take the amount of revenue coming in 
and subtract it from the costs to run the business to figure out their earnings.57 
Understanding these nine blocks, the importance of each one individually along 
with the interconnectivity of them all, gives any type of company a business model that it 
can use to achieve success.  As mentioned when describing this model, certain types of 
businesses will emphasize different aspects of this canvas, but no matter which blocks on 
which they focus, this business model helps a company make money.  However, when 
narrowing down the framework for analysis of the Mexican drug cartels, not all nine 
blocks described in Business Model Generation will be utilized, as will be explained in 
the next section.  Instead, the next section will structure a business model that has only 
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four elements.  It will take into account the nine-block approach that was just described, 
but will also incorporate other literature from strategy and technology and innovation. 
C. FROM NINE BLOCKS TO FOUR 
Rather than describing a nine-block approach to a business model, Johnson, 
Christensen, and Kagermann propose a method for evaluating a company’s business 
model by focusing on four interlocking elements: customer value proposition (CVP), 
profit formula, key resources, and key processes.  These four elements help a company 
“create and deliver value” with some similarities to Business Model Generation.58  
However, it places more emphasis on the activities and assets required for success, which 
are an integral part of how the drug cartels operate.  The following section will highlight 
these four elements, which then lead into the framework for analysis that will be used to 
evaluate the Mexican drug cartels.   
1. Customer Value Proposition 
CVP, just like value proposition, describes what customers need to solve their 
problems or complete a job; thus creating value for the customer.  That job can be viewed 
as a “fundamental problem in a given situation that needs a solution.”59  Having a precise 
understanding of what the customer wants is crucial, and to do this, a company should 
focus on one of the four common barriers that prevent customers from getting a job done: 
“insufficient wealth, access, skill, or time.”60  For example, drug cartels provide human 
smuggling services and supply routes for drugs, something that its customers have neither 
the access nor the skills needed to implement those jobs, especially within the deviant 
world. 
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2. Profit Formula 
Profit formula incorporates revenue, cost, and turnover rates to determine “how 
the company creates value for itself while providing value to the customer.”61  When 
evaluating a business, the authors recommend starting with the costs required to deliver 
the CVP to the customer.  These costs take into account the fixed and variable costs and 
help determine how many resources will be needed to support the expected volume.  This 
evaluation also gives the company an idea of where the break-even point is, and what it 
needs to charge in order to make a profit.62 
3. Key Resources and Key Processes 
The last two elements, key resources and processes, parallel the building blocks of 
key resources and activities described in Business Model Generation.  Key resources are 
the assets “required to deliver the value proposition to the targeted customer.”63  They 
include the people, technology, facilities, and equipment, but also include how those 
elements interact.  Key processes are the “operational and managerial processes that 
allow [a company] to deliver value in a way [it] can successfully repeat and increase in 
scale.”64  They include activities such as service, training, and planning, but also include 
rules and norms.  The relationship between the key resources and processes is crucial to 
accomplishing the job for the customer.65  For example, drug cartels combine their key 
resources and processes to traffic humans across the border into the United States; 
training and planning take place first followed by the execution of actions that combines 
both elements.  
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D. BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE 
MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS 
Both of the business models described in this Chapter offer adaptive approaches 
that can fit multiple types of businesses and activities by breaking down the business 
model into definable elements that can be used for evaluation.  For instance, if evaluating 
a retail company, the focus could be on the key resources it uses to complete the job, such 
as buildings for manufacturing, machines, people, and distribution channels.66  For an 
individual product, such as the Apple iPod, the emphasis is on the customer value 
proposition, which provides customers with an easy way to “search, buy, and enjoy 
digital music.”67  By having a basic understanding of what a company does, its business 
model can be evaluated using any number of lenses from the business models just 
described.  However, inside knowledge of boardroom meetings or executive guidance is 
not crucial for this evaluation, but instead it is the actions that a company performs that 
will be examined.  Understanding what a company does to make money is essential to 
understanding its business model.68  To evaluate the effective business practices of 
Mexican drug cartels, this thesis will pull from this four part business model and use it as 
the framework of analysis by examining the cartels through the lenses of customer value 
proposition, profit formula, key processes, and key resources.  But first, this framework 
will be applied to two legitimate companies to provide examples of how this analysis will 
work. 
1. Applying the Framework for Analysis to Legitimate Businesses 
Using the four parts of a business model, this section will give two brief examples 
of how a government organization and a retail store can be analyzed through the lenses of 
CVP, profit formula, key resources, and key processes.  The purpose of this section is to 
establish a basis of comparison, not necessarily directly related to Mexican DTOs, but 
instead as a general comparison as to how the framework of analysis can be applied both 
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in the legitimate business world, such as these example of the Navy and Apple, and to the 
illicit world, as will be seen in the following chapters. 
a. U.S. Navy 
The U.S. Navy will be used as an example of a government organization.  
When applying this analytical framework, the first part of the business model is the CVP.  
However, before looking at the value it provides for its customers, who the customers are 
must be determined.  For the Navy, its customers are the citizens of America, and it 
provides them with security that allows them to live their way of life.  For instance, all 
four barriers for entry described in the previous section, wealth, access, skill, and time, 
prevent citizens from providing that security for themselves.  Thus the Navy solves that 
problem by either waging war against an enemy or deterring potential disruptions to trade 
through a presence around the world.  However, unlike most businesses, the Navy does 
not sell goods or services to pay for this CVP.   
The profit formula of the Navy is drastically different than that of drug 
trafficking, as will be discussed later, because the Navy is not in the business of making 
money.  Instead, the Navy aims to spend 100% of its revenues each year.  Thus, the ins 
and outs of its profit formula should balance each other out.  Funding for the Navy comes 
from the U.S. government through taxpayer dollars in the form of a Federal Budget.  For 
instance, in fiscal year 2012, the Federal Budget allocated $157 billion to the U.S. Navy, 
and then added an additional $16 billion to fund contingency operations around the 
world.69  In turn, the Department of the Navy allocated that money to different specific 
programs and operations, such as the deployment of an aircraft carrier or the operations 
of the Blue Angels, and planned its budget using those funds for that entire fiscal year.  
At the end of that year, ideally, those funds would be drawn down to zero and the next 
year’s budget would allocate new funds to start the yearly cycle over again.  That money 
is then used to operate most of the Navy’s key assets. 
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The Navy relies on numerous key assets, such as personnel, ships, and 
aircraft, to help deliver that security to the American citizens.  For instance, its 288 ships 
include aircraft carriers, submarines, guided missile cruisers, and supply ships that are 
capable of sustained operations anywhere in the world.70  Additionally, the Navy’s 
reputation of its SEALs is now well known throughout the world thanks to successful 
operations such as the rescue of the Maersk Alabama’s captain from pirates and the secret 
mission that killed Osama Bin Laden.  These key resources ensure that the Navy can 
deliver value proposition to its customers. 
The Navy then uses those resources to deliver value to the American 
people.  To protect the way of life for its citizens, the Navy operates forward deployed 
around the world.  For example, as of January 2013, the Navy had 35 percent of its ships 
deployed and operating overseas.71   This forward deployment serves as a way to ensure 
that sea lines of communication and commerce remain open for the world’s economy; 90 
percent of the world’s trade travels via the ocean.72  In a time of war, the Navy has the 
capability to control these trade routes so that supplies only reach those states or 
organizations that it deems friendly.73  Additionally, deployments allow the Navy to 
deliver security to the American citizens in peacetime and war through its presence and 
ability to conduct combat operations.  
This business model of the U.S. Navy gives a brief overview of how the 
framework of analysis can be applied to a government organization.  In the next example, 
a different type of company will be looked at, Apple. 
b. Apple 
Apple is a company involved in numerous types of businesses, from 
manufacturing and selling its own products such as iPhones and iMacs to offering a 
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venue to purchase music and movies such as iTunes.  In this section, Apple’s App Store 
will be analyzed in the context of the business model it provides to App developers.  The 
purpose of using Apple is to show the versatility of the established analytical framework 
and its ability to bring out unique key factors that lead to success, no matter what type of 
business is examined.  However, as with the U.S. Navy example, this will not be an in-
depth analysis, but is instead intended to present a broad overview as a basis of 
comparison for the framework for analysis.  
The customer base for the App Store is actually two-fold, one involves 
consumers of the iPhone, iPad, and more recently computers, and the other involves 
developers who design the Apps.  For consumers, Apple has coined the phrase, “There’s 
an App for that,” implying that for anything a consumer needs, Apple has an App that can 
make everyday tasks easier.  This marketing in turn helped create a demand for new apps 
that make consumers’ lives better. However, Apple offers very few Apps that are 
designed and built in house.  Instead, it provides App developers and computer 
programmers with an ability to tap into an established infrastructure and brand name that 
has been built through years of innovative products, much of which gained fame with the 
introduction of the iPod and iTunes in 2001 and 2003, respectively, and a customer base 
of over 500 million people.74  Thus, without access to this network, these developers 
would face considerable challenges overcoming the barriers of entry of going from 
design to implementation of an App, and more significantly, would not have access to 
iPhone and iPad users legally.  But by using Apple’s already established network, these 
designers have the ability to market their App globally and, if successful, make a large 
profit. 
The Profit Formula of the App Store is simple, 70 percent of the revenues 
made through the App Store are returned to the developer and Apple keeps the rest.  
There are no hosting or marketing fees for listing an App through Apple, so if an App 
fails and does not get downloaded by any users, neither Apple nor the programmer 
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receive revenue.  However, all revenues, including purchases within an App and 
advertisements, get charged 30 percent by Apple.75  In return, Apple spends money on 
operating its App Store and supporting network including salaried employees and 
overhead, advertisements, and branding.  However, most of these costs are negligible 
because the App Store is merely tapping into Apple’s already established infrastructure 
that was developed through other businesses such as iTunes.  This puts Apple in a 
position to offer access to its network at little cost to itself, and in turn bringing in 
significant revenue, $6.9 billion in 2011, while the developers do most of the innovative 
work.76 
The key resources of the App Store revolve around its access to Apple’s 
brand name and infrastructure.  Through new products that redefined music, phones, and 
computers, Apple has built up a reputation of designing innovative products that that are 
in high demand.  Additionally, since the invention of the iPod in 2001, and later iTunes in 
2003, it has established a network that can easily support and reach its half a billion App 
Store users and give them easy access to search Apps from their iPhone or iPad.  These 
key resources are vital to the App Store’s success, but how Apple uses those resources to 
deliver value is its greatest success. 
The Key Process of the App Store is its contracting model.  As mentioned, 
Apple had already established an infrastructure because of other products, so designing 
and supporting an App Store was not a significant project or risk.  So, instead of hiring 
countless programmers to design and produce Apps for its new store, it passed that task, 
and its associated risk, off to the contract world.  This approach pushes entrepreneurs to 
be on the lookout for the next great innovative App, knowing that if successful they can 
make millions of dollars.  For instance, in 2012, two App development studios brought in 
over $100 million just with games designed for the App Store.77  However, it also places 
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the risk of failure, including losing all the money invested in development and testing of 
an App, in the hands of the entrepreneur.  So Apple is in a position to make a significant 
amount of money if an App succeeds, but if an App fails, Apple loses nothing while the 
contractor loses the time and money invested in designing that particular App. 
This business model of Apple’s App Store is drastically different than that 
of the U.S. Navy.  Both serve different customers using completely different key 
resources and processes, and the U.S. Navy looks to spend 100 percent of its money 
whereas Apple attempts to run a profitable company.  However, these examples also shed 
light on how this analytical framework can be used to bring out the aspects of a particular 
business that make it successful.  More importantly, when applying this framework to the 
effective business practices of the Mexican DTOs, Apple’s ability to pass risk off to the 
contractor will be a significant aspect of how the cartels operate.   
E. CONCLUSION 
In Chapter III and Chapter IV, this thesis will look at the Mexican drug cartels 
through the lens of their key activities and key resources.  It will focus on individual 
aspects of the cartels and what they do to capture and create value.  These lenses will 
shed light on how they move people and goods across the border, the way they launder 
money, how they mitigate the risk of confiscation, capture, and being killed, the way they 
adapt to changing environments, and how they innovate to stay ahead of their competitors 
and authorities.  However, it is imperative to understand how the key activities and 
processes work with other elements of the business model to understand where these 
aspects fit into the big picture.  At the end of the day, drug cartels are no different from 
any legitimate business in that they just want to make money.78 
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III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS TO DRUG 
TRAFFICKING 
When most people hear of drug cartels or DTOs, the first thing that comes to 
mind is drug trafficking.  This activity is their most lucrative business and accounts for 
profits that range from $6.6 billion to upwards of $39 billion per year.79  Using the 
analytical framework previously established, this Chapter will look at the drug trafficking 
business through the lenses of CVP, profit formula, key resources, and key activities.  
Because this is the first chapter utilizing that framework in the context of illicit 
operations, it will also highlight some of the general practices used by cartels to establish 
the infrastructure that encapsulates all of their illicit activities, such as capturing value in 
the drug trafficking business.  Additionally, the effective business practices found in the 
drug trafficking model can also be applied to other activities that involve moving an 
illegal product across the border and into the U.S.  The following pages will look at how 
Mexican DTOs capture value in the drug trafficking business, demonstrating why they 
are so elusive to law enforcement and how they are able to continuously stay ahead of 
programs meant to severely cripple their operations.   
A. CVP 
Although this thesis does not address the supply versus demand discussion that 
plagues policy meetings in Washington and newspaper editorials, that discussion does 
have relevance when applied in the context of the demand for drugs in the U.S. and the 
customer base that it provides DTOs.  The demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. has 
remained relatively steady for the previous three decades, with different drugs being 
popular in different markets.80  With a steady demand spanning over 30-years, DTOs 
have had numerous time to learn their customer base and figure out what they can 
provide to serve the needs of those people.  For example, cartels have learned that 
younger drug users such as college students or freelancers in New York City prefer 
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marijuana, whereas professionals such as lawyers and accountants with higher incomes 
prefer cocaine.81  The fact that different markets exist is important when describing the 
customer value proposition offered by the Mexican DTOs.  These organizations 
understand the different markets and cater to those particular demands.  Those users drive 
the market for distributors and drug dealers through their demand of illicit drugs.  
Without the strong demand, the distributors and sellers would not be willing to pay top 
dollar for a shipment of drugs. 
Driven by a consistent demand for illicit drugs over the past three decades, 
Mexican DTOs have expanded their drug trafficking business throughout the U.S.  Some 
reports estimate that as of 2011, drug cartels had operations set up in over 1,000 
American cities.82  Their outreach reflects an understanding of customer demands for a 
product that, outside of drug cartel involvement, is impossible to obtain.  Even if a DTO 
were not involved in the eyes of the final consumer, it would have had a significant role 
getting that product into the U.S.  Because the sales and usage of drugs are illegal, 
customers turn to the illicit market to satisfy their needs.  Illicit activities “satisfy demand 
for goods and services that are otherwise illegal or unavailable in the formal, licit 
economy.”83  Deviant entrepreneurs, such as the drug cartels, are always searching for 
unfilled demand that exists because of regulations and laws.84  Drug cartels provide the 
supply portion of this equation by putting the drugs in the hands of distributors and 
dealers.  In some cases, DTOs are even involved in the exchange on the street level, but 
focus most of their efforts on the logistics of moving drugs across the border and to 
distribution centers in the U.S.   
DTOs also recognize that individual drug users do not show loyalty to a cartel or 
trafficking organization.  This mindset is different than customers in the smartphone 
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market, who do not see all phones, or their operating systems, as equal.  For example, 
Apple has developed a brand name within the smart phone industry, and some customers 
will only buy iPhones, even if it requires paying more.  However, other customers are 
instead loyal to Google’s Android software and will only buy non-Apple products.  Still a 
third set of customers, who most closely resemble the consumer behavior of drug users, 
will seek the most easily accessible or cheapest phone to fulfill their needs, regardless of 
the brand.  Drug users act similar to that third set of customers; they just want the illicit 
product, whether it is cocaine or marijuana, but do not care which DTO had a hand in 
delivering it.  Therefore, DTOs focus on controlling the routes that allow access to the 
U.S., which along the border becomes the bottleneck of the illicit supply chain.  Amongst 
these multiple smuggling routes, referred to as plazas, the controlling cartel develops a 
logistical monopoly on the control of who and what passes through its smuggling route 
and into the U.S.85  Additionally, an illicit product has significant value added to it as it 
passes through this bottleneck and into the U.S., which provides the incentive to the 
cartels to maintain control of those routes and eliminate competition at all costs.86  This 
control also limits other organizations or individual customers from entering the drug 
trade business, and thus ensures a DTO’s survival by continuing to deliver drugs to its 
customer base.87   
DTOs, as experts in underworld logistics, solve the customer’s problem by 
delivering illicit drugs.  In return, the customers are willing to pay top dollar for the value 
of that delivery, especially in markets with higher regulation.  
B. PROFIT FORMULA 
Through different drug trafficking activities, the DTOs are able to thrive in the 
illicit underworld by controlling who covertly moves shipments of illicit materials across 
the border and into the hands of distributors and drug dealers.  On the street, drug users 
are willing to pay top dollar for a product that cannot be bought in a legitimate market.  
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This section will look at the revenue and expenses involved in drug trafficking from the 
Cartels’ perspective.  Throughout most of the supply chain, DTOs are involved through 
contracts with buyers, smugglers, and traffickers.  These contracts allow the cartels to 
bring in large amounts of profits during each phase of the value chain while minimizing 
their personal and financial risk.  However, it is important to note that this section is not 
an attempt to present a financial analysis of the different cartels, but instead it will take a 
broad look at what kind of processes create revenues and what kind of expenses are 
associated with those activities.  Estimates vary when it comes to the actual revenues and 
cost of moving drugs across the border because financial statements do not exist 
publically and most transactions only involve cash.88  However, empirical data does exist 
that shows the price of drugs in various markets (see Figure 1), either by ounce or pound, 
along with the initial cost a cartel or supplier incurs when they purchase the drugs.  This 
data will be used to highlight the lucrative business of trafficking drugs and the expenses 
that come with it.  In this section, a bigger picture of the ins and outs that the DTOs face 
will be presented. 
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Figure 1.  Cocaine Prices in the United States.89 
1. Revenue (The Ins) 
Mexican DTOs involved with drug trafficking receive revenues through their 
control of plazas and the high profit margins associated with selling drugs in illicit 
markets.  Controlling the territory along the U.S. border gives a DTO the ability to decide 
who crosses that stretch of the border and who does not.  For instance, when smaller, 
independent operators get involved with drug transportation, they must pay taxes to the 
controlling cartel, often upwards of 60 percent of the perceived value of the shipment.90  
When others refute the tax payments, they are often killed by the controlling cartel.  
Additionally, DTOs contract with local gangs in Mexico and the U.S. who charge taxes 
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to drug dealers on the street, which in turn provide revenue for the cartels.91  These types 
of revenues are only present when a DTO controls a market, but that control also makes it 
a target by competing organizations. 
Drugs produce significant profit margins.  Once drugs cross into the United 
States, their profit margins skyrocket because of the risk associated with crossing the 
border (See Figure 2).  However, within Mexico, the profit margin is significantly lower 
because smugglers do not have to risk being arrested at the border or dying in the Arizona 
desert.92  For instance, studies have shown that the price of a kilo of cocaine increases 
upwards of 63 percent just by moving from a border city in Mexico, such as Juarez, to a 
border city in the U.S., such as El Paso.93  Even higher profit margins were seen if 
traffickers moved that cocaine well into the U.S., and in cities such as Chicago where 
cocaine sold for upwards of $33,000 a kilo, according to 2010 National Drug Intelligence 
Center (NDIC) data, that yielded an increase in price of 69 percent from a border city in 
Texas.94  A closer look at Figure 1 shows that cocaine more than doubles once it is 
moved from the southwest border up to the northeast.  Additionally, the map graphically 
depicts a second, imaginary border that reveals a jump in price once cocaine is 
transported beyond the southwestern states.  A more detailed analysis will be presented in 
the Future Research section of Chapter V, however the DTOs are aware of financial 
rewards that come from drug sales in the northeast. 
Interviews with members of the Sinaloa Cartel gave insight into 2012 prices and 
the profit margins associated with smuggling drugs across the border.  Sinaloa would buy 
a kilo of cocaine from Peru for about $2,000 and then watch it grow in value as it moved 
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north, selling for around $10,000 in Mexico, upwards of $30,000 in the U.S., and once 
broken down into grams and distributed to the street, that same kilo would sell for around 
$100,000.95  From start to finish, that kilo increased in value almost 5,000 percent, which 
shows just how lucrative drug trafficking can be.  Those profit margins are not limited to 
cocaine; for instance, marijuana is sold in Casas Grandes, a city south of Juarez, for $80 
per pound, but in Ohio, the price increases over 1,000 percent to $1,000 per pound.96  An 
example of this value chain can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  The Cocaine Value Chain From Colombia To the U.S.97 
Although the sale of drugs can be seen as a one-time payment, cartels understand 
the market for returning customers.  Drug addictions bring people back once they become 
hooked.  Cartels have been known to allow contractors to use the “bait and hook” 
technique, a method that can encourage future purchases.98  For example, a company like 
AT&T might offer a free cellular phone to its customers because it knows that it will 
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capitalize on the contract for service.99  DTOs have encouraged contractors to use similar 
techniques as a way to push new drugs and increase user demand.  For instance, Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents reported that the Sinaloa cartel established a 
methamphetamine market by providing free samples to those contractors distributing to 
marijuana clients.  Meth was “ragingly addictive and could be produced cheaply and 
smuggled with relative ease.”100  Sinaloa wanted the meth market, so they made it easy 
for customers try it out, knowing that once a customer tried it, he or she would be back. 
2. Expenses (The Outs) 
The high profit margins from trafficking drugs do not come without a cost.  DTOs 
must pay their employees, hire contractors, pay bribes, purchase and lease equipment and 
houses, and invest in research and development.  Subcontractors and individual 
contractors perform most of the activities involved in the drug supply chain.  Contracts 
are usually paid by cartels for individual smuggling runs and range in price depending on 
the reliability of the smuggler and the amount of drugs in a shipment.  For example, a 
Mexican family used to receive $1,000 from a trafficking organization to drive a 
preloaded car full of drugs across the U.S. border.  If the car was loaded down with a 
larger shipment, the family would be paid upwards of $1,500 for one trip, however larger 
loads were only moved once the contractor had made several successful trips.  Not all 
contractors were paid the same though; DTOs paid some smugglers only $500 to move 
the same amount of drugs.101   
In addition to contracted smugglers, DTOs have numerous employees and 
contractors on payroll to ensure the successful operations of drug trafficking.  One 
example is hired scouts that monitor the area for authorities.  In a coordinated event to 
smuggle drugs, contractors work together to outsmart Border Patrol: the lookout informs 
the smuggler which border checkpoint lane to use or when a section of the border is clear 
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so that the drugs have the highest probability of making it across the border.102  These 
paid contractors are instrumental to the numerous techniques utilized by DTOs and give 
cartels the best chance of successfully smuggling drugs into the U.S.  On the American 
side of the border, DTOs pay contracts to convenience store clerks, distributors at stash 
houses, logistic experts and drivers, additional scouts, and even drivers that transport 
drug smugglers back to Mexico.103  How these individuals interact together will be 
covered in more detail when discussing key activities. 
DTOs also rely on subcontractors to run self-sustaining operations within various 
steps of the drug trafficking supply chain.  Subcontracting helps cartels minimize 
personal risk by paying others to conduct risky operations, such as moving drugs across 
the border, while still keeping the revenues generated from a successful movement.104  
These cells exist in numerous forms, from large companies such as the Garibaldi-Lopez 
trafficking organization that smuggles drugs for the Sinaloa cartel, to entrepreneurs 
capable of developing new products for a cartel, such as Miguel Angel Montoya who 
designed and built a new kind of submersible.105  To stay ahead of the competition and 
develop new technology, cartels turn to venture capitalism.  Venture capitalism, common 
in legitimate businesses, is a way that companies can raise capital for a new project or 
technology.106  The cartels, in this case, provide the seed capital for a project, while the 
new venture, external to the cartel organization, does all of the research and 
development.107     
In addition to paying contractors and subcontractors who move drugs through the 
supply chain, DTOs also provide funding to “numerous other bribed operatives, 
                                                 
102 Ibid., 110–111. 
103 Ibid., 110–111. 
104 Andrew R. Dainty, Geoffrey H. Briscoe, and Sarah J. Millett, “Subcontractor Prospectives on 
Supply Chain Alliances,” Construction Management and Economics 19, no. 8 (2001): 841–842, doi.org. 
10.1080/01446190110089727. 
105 Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” 9; Nieto-Gomez, 
“The Geopolitics of Clandestine Innovation in the Drug Business,” 158. 
106 Geoffrey Jones and R. Daniel Wadhwani, “Entrepreneurship and Business History: Renewing the 
Research Agenda,” working paper for Harvard Business School, 2006, 3. 
107 Peter K. Jacobs, “Venture Capital: Spurring Innovation and Growth,” New Business: 
Entrepreneurial Pursuits at Harvard Business School, 2002. 
 39 
politicians, policemen, military officers, customs officers, soldiers, and intelligence 
officers” to conduct operations.108  Mexican DTOs are similar to multinational 
corporations with complex structures and organizations.  They have people in positions 
similar to legitimate businesses, such as purchasing agents, transportation specialists, 
boat captains, drivers, lawyers, and communication experts.  In order to provide 
protection for their leadership and the drug shipments, DTOs also hire arms procurers 
along with experts in providing security and conducting assaults.109  Besides the 
overhead from payrolls, DTOs fund subcontractors to lease and purchase houses in both 
the U.S. and Mexico to store supplies and act as distribution centers. 
DTOs have a large network of houses along the U.S. border and throughout the 
U.S.  These stash houses act like warehouses and function as distribution channels to 
various drug markets.110  Other overhead items include airplanes and cars, along with 
mechanics that maintain those machines.  Subcontractors even purchase legitimate 
businesses within the U.S. as a cover for trafficking; some examples include used car 
dealerships and racehorses.111  
The list of expenditures associated with drug trafficking appears to be endless.  
Whether monthly payments are made in the forms of bribes or contract work to people or 
cells associated with smuggling, or one-time payments are made to purchase assets, the 
expenses are numerous.  However, in addition to monetary figures, the costs associated 
with drug trafficking also takes into account captured or killed cartel members, along 
with confiscated drug shipments.  Due to the risk associated with transporting an illicit 
product, DTOs consider losing a shipment of drugs as the cost of doing business.112  The 
capture of one contractor, or even disruption of an entire subcontractor operation, is 
hardly a defeat to any DTO and will be discussed in more detail when discussing how 
they use their organizational structure.  But the cartels are willing to take on a significant 
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amount of risk in order to receive an even higher profit in return.  Once those drugs are 
successfully smuggled into the U.S., profit margins can easily exceed 1,000 percent.  For 
instance, a standard suitcase allowed on international flights filled with 25 kilos of 
cocaine, which a DTO could have purchased for less than $60,000, is worth about 
$440,000 once arriving in the U.S.113  Even if one out of every two smugglers is caught, 
the cartels still turn a huge profit and are therefore willing to continue spending money on 
new innovations to smuggle drugs.  The cartels understand the high price they can charge 
for smuggling drugs into the U.S. and capitalize on that market, whether charging 
outsiders to use their routes or moving drugs themselves.114 
C. KEY RESOURCES 
The previous section outlined the costs associated with the people and assets used 
by the DTOs.  This section will look at the tangible and intangible resources used by the 
cartels to traffic drugs.  People make up a significant portion of the tangible resources 
used by the DTOs.  But they are more than just bodies to fill an army, those people also 
provide an intangible asset through their intellect and abilities that help cartels innovate 
and develop new technologies.  In addition to their people, DTOs also utilize other 
tangible assets such as money, stash houses, equipment, and transportation vehicles.  
Beyond what outsiders can see or confiscate, it is the intangible resource of their 
reputation that help DTOs’ thrive.  They have a reputation of being ruthless to those that 
stand in their way, and through public displays of violence, outsiders know that crossing 
a cartel can result in a gruesome death.  
1. DTOs and their People 
From the leaders to the workers, the people that work for and contract with the 
drug cartels are a significant asset.  However, these people differ significantly when 
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compared to their legitimate counterparts with regards to formal education and 
upbringing because most have little schooling past grade school.  While there are a 
handful of successful CEOs in legitimate companies that have found success without a 
college degree, such as Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Michael Dell, it is the norm for 
executives to have both college and postgraduate degrees.  However, in illicit businesses, 
the type of education employees receive is usually focused on applicability for a 
particular trade.   
Within the drug trafficking industry, most workers, and even executives, work 
their way up from the bottom rungs, often spending time in various apprenticeships to 
learn the drug trade.115  For instance, Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar received 
little formal education.116  El Chapo Guzman, the leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel, 
dropped out of school when he was in third grade.  Even as an adult, Chapo struggled to 
read and write and even had an assistant write love letters for him to his numerous 
mistresses.117  The leaders of the drug cartels rely on a strong understanding of their 
networks and how to maximize their profits without being exposed to risk, and operators, 
whether smugglers, lookouts, or enforcers, have a high-risk tolerance because failure 
often results in death or incarceration.  Regardless of the position in the hierarchy of drug 
trafficking, these crafts are honed through first hand experience during operations and on 
the streets.  DTOs continue to groom future leaders and operators by putting them to the 
test through real world trafficking operations, which in turn gives cartels a significant 
asset in the human capital of their people.118   
2. The Organizational Structure 
To limit risk and minimize a single point of failure, cartels utilize an innovative 
organizational structure.  While new drug trafficking methods and tools help reduce the 
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chances of confiscation and improve efficiency, the organization of DTOs also provide a 
level of redundancy and flexibility that is needed to operate within the illicit world.  Their 
social networks are built with the ability to expand and take advantage of new market 
opportunities.  However, they can also retract when regulatory constraints limit activities 
in a specific area.119  Another significant asset of having a flat organization is that DTOs 
minimize their exposure; each small operation, or cell, is only privy to the information 
needed for its specific operation: “Many of the functions of a cartel are in fact carried out 
by cells, which are groups of outsourced growers, packagers, drivers, warehouse guards, 
gunmen, street sellers, etc., who have little or no connection to the larger drug 
organization and whose services are bought and paid for with cash or drugs.”120 
The hub of a DTO provides direction to its various cells and workers.  That core 
group contracts services out to peripheral groups that are not full-fledged members of the 
cartel.  Peripheral groups, also referred to as nodes, perform tasks such as smuggling, 
distributing, and money laundering.  These groups are compensated for their work, but 
are also threatened with violence and death should they become disloyal.  In essence, 
they are employees who have no choice but to work for the cartel when required, but 
when not contracted, they must be careful about going to a competing organization.  
Peripheral nodes operate in small groups, independent of each other, and at times even 
perform the same tasks.121  One example of this independent type of operation can be 
seen with the Garibaldi-Lopez trafficking organization, a contractor of the Sinaloa cartel.  
Before it was stopped by authorities, this organization moved an estimated 400,000 
pounds of marijuana from Mexico to stash houses in Phoenix each year and brought in 
more than $1 billion in revenue.122  This redundancy mitigates risk to the DTO, so if law 
enforcement disrupts an operation, only one node is lost, while others continue to operate. 
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Numerous contractors and subcontractors make up each DTO and estimates vary 
on the specific number of people a cartel has on its payroll at any one time.  For instance, 
at its core, a cartel might only have 15–50 members, but when encompassing all of those 
working directly or indirectly for a cartel, that number then expands to 2,000, and at 
times upwards of 150,000 people.123  These estimates vary because of the flat, multi-
nodal organizational structure of DTOs.  These organizations contract out to individual 
cells and feed them only the information needed to complete the job.  By 
compartmentalizing and only sharing bits and pieces of information to different groups, a 
layer of secrecy exists that protects the DTO.  Often different cells will run similar 
operations without knowledge of each other.  This separation keeps the organizational 
structure secret, resilient, and protects the business from other cartels and government 
authorities.124  In addition to providing risk aversion from foes, those cells can also 
minimize risk when it comes to the creativity needed for innovation and new ideas. 
Cartels are in a constant battle with each other for the lucrative revenues created 
when drugs are smuggled into the U.S.  In addition, they are constantly under attack from 
U.S. and Mexican public policies geared towards disrupting their operations.  To 
overcome these threats, and more importantly to survive, they must constantly adapt to 
the changing environment, new policies, and threats from other cartels so they can 
continue to move drugs from one side of the border to the other.  With their backs against 
a wall, cartels are forced to innovate and seek new methods to deliver their products.125   
Figuring out a more efficient way to move large shipments of illicit materials 
across the border can become extremely lucrative.  The profit margin from drug 
transportation is already high, but there is always a push to improve efficiencies so that 
drugs can be shipped in even larger quantities without disruption.  Contractors understand 
the financial incentives of getting drugs past government security, such as a suitcase 
containing $440,000 worth of cocaine smuggled past U.S. Customs, and approach border 
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security as a problem to solve.126  Once an entrepreneur has a solution, either in the form 
of a product or an idea, he or she could present that solution to a deviant Venture 
Capitalist (VC).  If the VC approves of the idea, he or she will work to get the 
entrepreneur funded to build and test a prototype.  The entrepreneur will not know which 
cartel is providing the funding, but knows that a successful technology may generate high 
payouts from that cartel.  Each government action along the border or even within the 
interior of the country sends a “signal to deviant entrepreneurs to improve their capacities 
and innovate a countermeasure to respond to the new shape of the system.”127    
A 2007 video by Miguel Angel Montoya sheds light on the type of venture capital 
operations used by Mexican drug cartels.  He is the designer of a submersible capable of 
carrying illicit products across large bodies of water.128  A cartel provided the capital 
needed to research, develop, and test the submersible while Montoya, as the entrepreneur, 
assumed the personal risk.  Cartels pass the risk on to others while they wait for the new 
technologies to be developed: “new entrepreneurs who have a new idea bear most of the 
physical risk, while the DTO risks only the seed capital.”129   
3. DTO Culture and Reputation 
The culture of loyalty is held in extremely high regard within DTOs.  Drug 
kingpins “are dangerous, yet always endangered” as rival DTOs and law enforcement 
agencies constantly try to kill or capture them.130  Leaders are always on the move in an 
effort to avoid surveillance.  The surrounding danger creates a culture that relies on trust.  
However, that trust and loyalty must be earned over time and is enforced by publically 
punishing those that are disloyal.  The danger associated with running a DTO is why 
leaders look to surround themselves with people whom they can trust and are hesitant to 
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work with people they know little about.  Cartel leaders hope to keep the reigns of the 
cartel within the family and its top leadership positions go to those who are loyal to their 
family, so they often seek out connections from family and friends.131  Relying on social 
networks is another way DTOs quickly build trust because they can limit interactions to 
only those individuals who are personally recommended by members already within the 
circle.132  Chapo, leader of the Sinaloa cartel, would purposely test those close to him by 
accidentally adding unaccounted drugs or money to a shipment to see if his executives 
would steal.133  Those who stole or were disloyal to a DTO and its leaders were hunted 
down and killed, often in a gruesome fashion.134 
News outlets and social media, such as YouTube, have helped DTOs develop a 
reputation of being extremely violent.  A quick search on Google will reveal gruesome 
images of headless bodies lying in the street and people strung up along a highway 
overpass.  YouTube and other social media outlets show self-made videos of executions 
and decapitations, some of which the victim begs for his life and then suffers as his 
capturers saw off his head with a dull knife.135  The violence in Mexico, and spillover 
violence within the U.S., has helped create a reputation that cartels can inflict a painful 
death on anyone they choose.  DTOs have been public in their attacks, often placing 
videos of beheadings on the Internet and purposely leaving their victims’ dismembered 
bodies in well-traveled areas.136  These gruesome murders are not accidents, but instead 
serve as warnings to not interfere with their operations or ability to make a profit.137  For 
example, in 2009, Mexico hailed one of its fallen sailors as a hero who killed a major 
drug kingpin in a gunfight.  Within hours of the deceased sailor’s identity being 
announced, cartel members retaliated by murdering his mother, aunt, sister, and 
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brother.138  From 2006 to 2012, there were between 47,500 to 60,000 deaths related to 
drug violence in Mexico.139  The cartels publicized these killings to scare citizens and 
local police into submission.  For instance, in 2006, La Familia cartel dumped five human 
heads in the middle of a crowded dance club and left a note stating that they only kill 
“those who deserve to die.”140  The day prior, cartel members had supposedly kidnapped 
the victims from a mechanic shop, then used bowtie knives to hack off their heads while 
the men squirmed in pain.141  Los Zetas cartel members are even trained in torture 
techniques, and have been known to implement gruesome and painful torture and 
killings.142  To discourage police informants, cartels have been known to cut fingers off 
their victims while still alive, stuff them in the victim’s mouth, and then after a long and 
drawn out suffering, cut off the victim’s head.  Spying for another cartel equates to being 
shot in the ear, and womanizing with the cartels’ women results in castration while the 
victim is still alive.143  These gruesome acts manage to leave a lasting impression and are 
enough to discourage people to stand in the way of a DTO or, even worse, betray their 
trust.144 
4. Tangible Assets Used to Smuggle Drugs 
To help with enforcement and other drug trafficking activities, DTOs have access 
to numerous caches of military-style weapons throughout Mexico and the U.S.  Within 
the U.S., cartels such as Los Zetas have small assassin teams with their own access to 
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specialized weapons should the organization call on them.145  Another resource utilized 
by the cartels is their ability to blend in with their surroundings.  Frequently DTO 
members dress in military or police uniforms in order to have unimpeded access to 
targets or uninterrupted movement between hideouts.146 
Besides DTOs having members who specialize in enforcement and torture, these 
organizations are made up of people with numerous backgrounds and abilities.  Without 
knowledge of the infrastructure of a DTO, one might generalize cartels as people with 
limited education who commit ruthless acts to make money.  Even those who operate on 
the enforcement side of a DTO typically have specialized training.  For example, 
deserters from Mexican Special Forces founded the Los Zetas cartel after their original 
stent working for the Gulf Cartel.  Recruitment is not limited to Mexico either; Los Zetas 
have also expanded recruitment to Central and South America to include specially trained 
troops like the Guatemalan Special Forces and offered incentives such as significant 
salary increases to join their ranks.147   
When comparing the operational side of a DTO to a legitimate company, there is 
not much difference.  For instance, DTOs rely on lawyers, accountants, buyers, investors, 
recruiters, and trainers to help with all of their day-to-day activities.148  Managers are 
involved in various stages of decision-making and they must possess communication 
skills and balance the amount of micromanagement into their employees’ activities.149  
Regardless of the technique used by the various workers, their expertise helps DTOs 
thrive, whether providing a skill needed to run any type of corporation, or helping with 
innovation so the cartel can stay ahead of its competition. 
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DTOs also rely on key pieces of equipment to facilitate smuggling operations.  
For instance, cartels fund the development of submarines that are capable of carrying ten 
tons of cocaine to the shores of the U.S., with some submarines even possessing the 
capability to do the entire journey submerged.150  DTOs also have built tunnels that 
provide linkage from one side of the border to the other, some of which have been in 
existence since the late 1980s and only continue to improve in complexity.  Tunnels 
being discovered today are capable of moving heavy shipments of drugs efficiently using 
cables and trolley cars.151  Once a new product is designed and tested, such as a new 
submersible or even a catapult or pneumatic gun to shoot the drugs across the border, it is 
immediately put to use.152  Submersibles and tunnels are just two of many assets used in 
the drug trafficking business, but cartels are constantly testing new equipment in order to 
overcome technologies designed by the government to combat them.153  However, once 
the drugs successfully enter into the U.S., the cartels then must rely on their network of 
supply channels within the U.S.   
5. Access to Supply Chains 
Smuggling drugs across the border is only one facet of the drug trafficking 
business.  The other key resource is the access to logistical networks within the U.S.  
DTOs utilize legitimate covers, such as rental houses and used car dealerships, to 
disguise drug movement.  Similar to a supply chain for a legitimate business, these 
networks help deliver a product, in this case drugs, to the market through multiple 
interactions of contractors.154  These stash houses act as warehouses by providing 
inventory and distribution centers for different areas of the U.S. market.  Often stash 
houses are found in middleclass neighborhoods relatively close to the border, such as in 
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El Paso and San Diego.155  Other legitimate businesses, from owning used car 
dealerships to breeding and racing horses, offer access to distribution channels without 
drawing suspicion from authorities.  These types of businesses give DTOs a legal excuse 
to constantly be on the move throughout the U.S., whether trading vehicles between two 
car dealerships or transporting a horse to its next race.156  As authorities close in on one 
aspect of the supply chain, DTOs flex and move a different legitimate business to keep 
the flow of drugs moving. 
To pay the large number of contracts, supply the weapons, purchase equipment, 
and purchase the drugs, DTOs rely on large amounts of cash.  Due to the illicit nature of 
drug trafficking, payments are often only made in cash.  Chapter IV will be devoted to 
moving that cash back to the DTOs, but it is estimated that $20 billion to $25 billion in 
bulk cash flows south through the U.S. border from drug trafficking every year.157  Over 
time, cartels accumulate and stash large amounts of cash, which give them tremendous 
power when it comes to purchasing and executing their various activities.  However, 
excessive amounts of cash also put DTOs at risk because they have do not have a way to 
easily store the cash for safekeeping. 
The key resources of drug trafficking encompass a vast amount of assets, from 
intangibles such as DTO reputation, to tangibles such as submersibles and tunnels.  
However, the people that make up the cartels, and their organizational structure, give 
DTOs the ability to adapt during turmoil, flex to capture market opportunities, and 
innovate to stay ahead of competition.  As will be discussed in key processes, the most 
significant resources of the DTOs are the ones that authorities and competitors do not 
know about. 
D. KEY PROCESSES 
This section will discuss the how of drug trafficking and provide the link between 
CVP and the key resources.  It will use narratives as a way to demonstrate the various 
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tactics used by DTOs, both complex and simple, to move drugs across the U.S. border 
and then distribute them to their customer base.  Studies show that 95 percent of the 
cocaine consumed in the U.S. travels through Mexico.  In addition, Mexico is a major 
supplier of other drugs such as heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.158  By building 
on the previous section, it will look at how those resources are used.  
Drug trafficking involves moving an illicit material, drugs, to a specific customer 
base, whether in Mexico, the U.S., or another country.  The key processes discussed here 
will primarily focus on drug trafficking that flows into and within the U.S.  However, 
regardless of where a drug shipment is going or which DTO is involved in the operation, 
DTOs attempt to minimize risk and maximize efficiency by operating in a manner that 
involves a coordinated effort of equipment, intelligence, and security to move illicit 
products across the border.159  One method they use to minimize risk and stay a step 
ahead of authorities is access to intelligence.   
1. Intelligence Provides the Eyes and Ears of a DTO 
It is worth mentioning intelligence briefly in this section because it plays a 
significant role in a cartel’s ability to stay ahead of most government actions to disrupt 
their operations.  Intelligence comes in many forms, from obtaining high tech equipment 
to putting numerous informants on payroll.  DTOs often have intelligence networks that 
rival those of developing countries.160  For instance, cartels maintain communication 
centers on both sides of the border and communicate through multiple devices at a time 
to make it difficult for authorities to monitor.161  Some of these devices are as 
sophisticated as Voice over Internet Protocol and “high frequency radios with encryption 
and rolling codes to communicate during cross-border operations.”162  To access the 
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information needed to stay ahead of authorities, cartels use their stockpiles of cash to put 
numerous people on payroll, including government and police officials.  For instance, the 
Zetas employ thousands of people that range in age from young kids playing in the street 
to older citizens, whose jobs vary from white collar businessmen to blue collar taxi 
drivers.  These spies serve numerous roles, from providing early warning, deceiving 
outsiders, and working in jobs that serve to cover up operations.163   
2. Bribery and Extortion 
DTOs have also infiltrated Mexican police and government officials using bribery 
and extortion.  An example of how deep cartels have penetrated is evidenced in a 2011 
Congressional Research Service report that indicated ten percent of Mexican police 
officers were fired for known corruption.164  Another incident occurred in late 2008 when 
government agents arrested Mexico’s top antidrug chief, Ramirez Mandujano, for 
accepting $450,000-per-month to tip off cartels of upcoming raids and arrests.165  
Between corrupted police and tips from the antidrug chief, DTOs can avoid capture and 
confiscation and stay well ahead of authorities.  Additionally, cartels lean on their 
relationships with corrupted officials to “ensure impunity and facilitate smooth 
operations.”166  Police officials have even carried out violent acts on behalf of the DTOs, 
which is alarming because those actions allow a DTO to continue with their business of 
drug trafficking under the cover of the people who are supposed to be stopping them.167   
DTOs do not focus their bribery efforts on any specific position, but instead on 
people that have access to information the cartel deems important.  On a regional level, 
DTOs focus their bribes on local government officials who will assist in the area of 
operations.168  In some cities, the DEA estimates that cartels have an army of civilians 
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and cabdrivers who are bribed to report any increase in border inspections or convoys of 
police.169  Mexico’s secretary of public security estimates that a single cartel will pay 
more than a billion dollars in bribes each year.170  These bribes help cartel members stay 
out of trouble, and even when caught, give the cartel a sense of resiliency.  For instance, 
in 1993, authorities arrested Chapo for drug trafficking charges and moved him to 
Mexico’s version of a maximum-security prison.  However, because most of the prison 
staff was on the payroll of the Sinaloa cartel, he enjoyed a lavish lifestyle that included 
made to order meals, visits by prostitutes, and the ability to conduct business via a 
cellphone.  Once rumors of extradition to the U.S. surfaced, Chapo negotiated a prison 
escape by paying workers more than $3 million.171 
Chapo’s experience is common in Mexico due to so many people receiving bribes 
from DTOs.  This also gives cartels the ability to operate with confidence that even when 
caught, bribes will ensure their time in the hands of authorities is limited.  DTOs rely on 
bribery to get what they deem important, so they will often force government officials 
and police to accept payment by threatening plata o plomo, meaning silver or lead.172  
These threats were especially true in small towns throughout Mexico, where it is not 
uncommon for DTOs to drive into a town and nonchalantly inform the mayor that they 
would like to work there.  They bring with them the ability to enforce rules and even limit 
crime, and offer the mayor a choice: accept payment or they will kill him and his 
family.173 
3. Trafficking Operations 
How DTOs use their key resources to move drugs and illicit goods to their 
customer base ranges from rudimentary methods such as jumping a fence or swimming 
across the Rio Grande, to sophisticated and complex operations such as autonomous 
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submarines.  However, all operations are run with precision and careful planning.  One 
example involves placing scouts at high points along the border and well into the U.S. to 
report Border Patrol movement using solar-powered radios.  These scouts, who can 
number upwards of 50 people depending on the operation, are survival experts who can 
stay on location for weeks at a time using prepositioned food and water.174  Trafficking 
teams wait in hiding on the Mexican side for any break reported by the scouts.  As soon 
as the scouts report a section of the border that is clear, these teams race towards the 
border.175   
Another method for transporting drugs uses two specially equipped pickup trucks.  
One truck has enhanced shock absorbers so that it can carry more than one ton of illicit 
goods.  The other truck contains a special ramp, similar to the one depicted in figure 3, 
which extends hydraulically from its bed and makes an arch over the fence.  In less than a 
few minutes, the truck carrying the illicit goods can cross the border, without even 
touching the fence, and be on its way into the United States.176 
 
Figure 3.  Abandoned Truck with Hydraulic Lift Along U.S.–Mexico Border.177 
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Most of these movements are conducted under the cover of darkness using night 
vision goggles.  Once across the border, the truck will drive 40–80 miles through rugged 
canyons and desert until it reaches a paved highway, from which it will move the drugs to 
a stash house well inside of the U.S.  In the event Border Patrol spots the truck, it can be 
camouflaged and hidden for weeks.  If in hiding, the scouts reemerge and provide 
surveillance until the authorities move on.178  Once an operation is complete, scouts 
return to special housing provided within the U.S. and await redeployment.179  Other 
primitive transport methods involve putting drugs in a waterproof backpack and 
swimming to underground tunnels in the Rio Grande, or even brazenly floating drugs 
from one side of the river to the other.180  
These examples demonstrate the level of planning that goes into one drug 
trafficking run.  Operations like these take place continuously along the 2,000-mile 
border.  Traffickers working for the cartels describe movement via vehicles from Mexico 
into the deserts of Arizona as well planned and methodical.  For moving across the 
desert, DTOs utilize stolen vehicles and usually abandon them as soon as the drugs are 
offloaded.  Drivers receive training that involves driving with night vision goggles and 
how to avoid detection by seeking dry washes and barren areas.  Counter-surveillance 
scouts are trained to live in the desert for weeks at a time with limited supplies, and 
provide navigation directions and warn of approaching border patrol.  Any sign of law 
enforcement triggers the driver to cover the vehicle in a tarp.  These operators are well 
trained and know to patiently wait for perfect conditions.  They even can recognize when 
counterdrug operations are less than normal and will take advantages of such weaknesses 
by using as many as four vehicles at a time instead of just one.181 
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a. Human Intellect in Drug Trafficking 
DTOs also move shipments of drugs through border checkpoints.  Female 
smugglers have been known to drive across the border with their breasts partially 
exposed as successful distraction from the drugs hidden in the vehicle.  However, the 
flirting and low cut shirts are in addition to other coordinated efforts to effectively move 
drugs through a border station.  For example, even before approaching the border, 
lookouts will advise the driver on the specific traffic lane to use, based on the appearance 
or gender of the agents working that lane, so the driver has the best chance of 
succeeding.182  Other methods for sneaking drugs through a border patrol station show 
off the innovative side of the cartels.  Car experts will remanufacture engines so that part 
of the engine cavity can hide drugs.  In this example, the welds on the engine look so 
professional that even well trained border patrol agents have not been able to detect the 
modifications.  In one case, smugglers modified transportation trucks that run on propane 
and gasoline, gutting the propane tank to hide the drugs.  Even with the modifications, 
each fuel tank still worked and had enough fuel inside of them to fool agents.  When 
agents asked the driver to switch tanks to prove that no drugs were hidden inside, he did 
so without hesitation because the exhaust still gave off the distinct odor of propane, the 
fuel gage came to life, and no indications existed that suggested the truck was hiding 
drugs within its engine.183  Hidden compartments are also manufactured in regular car 
gas tanks, which not only hide the drugs but also throw off drug-sniffing dogs.184  Other 
parts of the car have also become smuggler favorites, from air bags to pickup truck bed 
liners; if there is space in the car, drug traffickers will find a way to hide drugs.185  
Traffickers were also successful in hiding drugs inside a car’s driveshaft.  There were 
reports that even when dogs alerted authorities that a vehicle was carrying drugs, 
investigators failed to find the drugs and sent the car on its way.186  
                                                 
182 Campbell, Drug War Zone, 110. 
183 Glenny, McMafia, 212. 
184 Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” 8. 
185 Campbell, Drug War Zone, 247. 
186 Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” 8. 
 56 
In these examples of border crossings, DTOs were successful because of 
the human intellect and creativity by the smugglers.  But these examples also shed light 
on the willingness of traffickers to innovate and develop new technologies and methods 
for moving drugs across the border.  The significant jump in profit from selling a drug in 
the U.S. versus Mexico influences traffickers to accept the risk, including torture or 
death, associated with smuggling.  Because of this high risk, and the high payout that 
comes with it, DTOs and their contractors are willing to allow entrepreneurs to pursue 
new ideas or develop new equipment such as the submersible developed by Miguel 
Angel Montoya.  If a new smuggler wants to enter the market, he or she first must seek 
permission from the controlling cartel, for failure to do so could result in capture, torture, 
and death.  With DTO approval, the smuggler might be given a small amount of drugs to 
test his or her abilities.  If the smuggler does not make it into the U.S., the DTO loses a 
negligible amount of drugs, but if the smuggler succeeds, the DTO receives a handsome 
profit and then adds a larger quantity for the smuggler’s next trip across the border.  The 
worst thing for the sponsoring cartel is that the drugs may become confiscated and the 
smuggler may be killed.  However, if the smuggler continues to succeed, the cartel rakes 
in huge profits while the smuggler sees his or her payouts increase.   
As discussed earlier, big payouts lure subcontractors and smugglers into 
the drug trafficking business, but once involved, the consequences of failure push these 
people to constantly innovate.  With a finite amount of border patrol agents and 
government officials to control the flow of traffic into the U.S., smugglers constantly 
probe for weaknesses and shift efforts to an area where they can maximize trafficking 
without being caught.  DTOs want the human intellect that new smugglers and 
entrepreneurs possess; the infrastructure of supply, enforcement, and networks on both 
sides of the border; but cartels still need innovators that can continue to find new ways of 
moving drugs across the border.  These examples were given as a way to shed light on 
the ingenuity side of their operations that are only limited by the creativity of the 
smugglers.  
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b. How DTOs use their Organizational Structure and 
Subcontractors 
To maximize efficiency and minimize personal risk, DTOs rely on 
contractors and subcontractors to conduct most of the drug trafficking operations.  For 
example, the Sinaloa cartel contracts with the Garibaldi-Lopez trafficking organization to 
move drugs across the border.187  That organization then subcontracts with individual 
smugglers who work with a network of other subcontractors to successfully complete an 
operation.  Numerous operations take place simultaneously, from concealing drugs 
through entry points such as airports and border check points, to covert operations such 
as going over or under the border fence.188   
In an example of driving through a border checkpoint, smugglers would be 
given a time and place in Mexico to pick up a vehicle loaded with drugs along with 
official documentation to permit travel into the U.S.  If the drivers were experienced 
smugglers, then the shipment would be large with drugs packed into numerous hidden 
compartments and doused with Pine-Sol or Ajax to hide the smell.  But if the drivers 
were relatively new, then they might only be given a small amount of drugs until they 
prove to be successful.189  After safely crossing the border, the drivers would proceed to 
a preplanned location such as a convenience store where the clerk, also a subcontractor, 
would signal that the shipment had arrived.  From there, a separate driver would pick up 
the smugglers and return them to the border where they would simply walk back across 
to Mexico, meet another driver, and return to their personal vehicle or another 
shipment.190  The network of subcontractors involved in an operation like this play an 
important role, from providing lookout positions to ensuring efficient movement of the 
appropriate goods: “drug-cartel activity involves intricate, loosely knit webs of 
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individuals and organizations that stretch from peasant farmers in Latin America to 
consumers in US towns and cities.”191   
The organizational structure of cartels plays a significant role in 
minimizing risk of drug trafficking operations.  In order to capture value in this illicit 
business, cartels must maintain a level of resilience that allows them to overcome the 
obstacles caused by rival cartels and government authorities.  As previously mentioned, 
the DTOs are often organized in cells that conduct simultaneous operations without the 
knowledge of other cells.  Shipments of illicit products are distributed to different 
subcontractors in Mexico who then transport the drugs across the border using the 
various techniques to move the drugs into the U.S.  DTOs use this organizational 
structure to give them flexibility and resilience, with each cell using its own techniques 
for smuggling and then initially moving the drugs to its own distribution center in the 
U.S.  One example of their added flexibility used to combat conflicts is to use these cells 
and other contractors as reserves.   
Similar to the practices of militaries such as the U.S. Navy, cartels will 
mobilize reserve troops in a specific area if needed, such as when a conflict with a rival 
cartel breaks out or authorities crack down on DTO activities.  Reserves can be pulled 
from other areas controlled by the cartel or from corrupt Mexican police.  For example, in 
2008, when authorities stepped up efforts to stop a drug trafficking plaza leading into 
McAllen, TX, Los Zetas called in reserves and ordered them “to engage law enforcement 
if confronted.”192  In addition to the reserves being able to act as a force multiplier, they 
also give a DTO a level of resilience should its members be captured or killed.   
Reserves also serve the purpose of a replacement system for DTO 
personnel.  For example, if a Los Zetas member is killed, that person’s role is filled 
immediately and business continues as normal by the next day.193  Even when the leader 
of a DTO is captured or killed, a new leader has often quickly filled the void, and in some 
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cases, even responded to the threat in a ferocious manner.194  Beyond the reserve 
component, contractors are also used to provide cover for illicit activity under a 
legitimate business. 
Significant value addition takes place when drugs are moved across the 
border, as depicted in Figure 4, but in order to maximize profits from the entire 
movement of drugs, DTOs oversee the distribution of drugs to markets throughout the 
U.S.  DTOs rely on their network of subcontractors and stash houses within the U.S. to 
make up the illicit goods supply chain.  Once drugs make it across the border, they go to 
a stash house to be packed into smaller quantities and shipped to different markets.  By 
breaking down the drugs into smaller quantities, traffickers make it easier to move 
inconspicuously throughout the U.S.195  For instance, drug traffickers moving through 
the deserts of Arizona, either by truck or foot, would have a drop off point at a stash 
house just south of Phoenix.  That stash house would serve as an arrival point, similar to 
a port of entry for a shipment from overseas.  From there, the drugs would be repackaged 
and loaded onto SUVs and trucks to be distributed to other stash houses or networks of 
customers.196  To disguise the stash houses, subcontractors often rent homes in middle 
class neighborhoods and tend to the house as any family would: maintaining the lawn, 
bringing the trashcans in, etc.  The difference is that neighbors rarely catch a glimpse of 
its occupants because the blinds always remain closed, and upon closer examination, the 
insides of windows are covered in plastic to prevent the smell of drugs from permeating 
the surrounding area.197  Subcontractors operate numerous stash houses in border cities 
and throughout the U.S., but in an effort to protect information leaking out, often these 
types of operations take place without knowledge of the location or occupants of other 
houses.  An example of the value chain of cocaine, from its origin in the Andean region 
all the way to the streets of its destination, can be seen in the Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Value Chain Activities of Cocaine from Colombia to the U.S.198 
These subcontractors help DTOs gain access to numerous cities 
throughout the U.S. and ensure that cartels profit off of each increase in value for a 
shipment of drugs.  Subcontractors seek out legitimate businesses in specific locations 
where they want to conduct operations and then offer those companies payments that 
exceed those of their normal day-to-day revenues.  Once a subcontractor develops a 
relationship with a particular company, it expects that business to devote most of its time 
and energy to illicit operations.199  The subcontractors will even go as far as providing 
invoices and receipts for bogus goods as a way to limit suspicion from authorities.200  As 
a final layer of security, DTOs only provide the information needed for a business to 
successfully run its specific operation and they limit the knowledge of other 
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subcontractors or businesses operating under a different cover.  This risk mitigation 
allows cartels to absorb supply chain disruptions caused by federal operations.  For 
instance, when a U.S. government official holds a press conference declaring the arrest of 
key cartel members in a drug smuggling operation, the reality is that a particular cartel 
only lost one of its many subcontracted operators.  Most likely, that cartel has so many 
simultaneous operations going on that an arrest does not even phase its drug trafficking 
business.201   
One example of this resiliency took place over a three-year period in the 
deserts of Arizona.  A U.S. operation, Operation Tumbleweed, led to the 2008 disruption 
of the Garibaldi-Lopez operation and its marijuana trafficking that was previously 
described.  Arrests were made and U.S. officials proclaimed a major blow to Mexican 
drug cartels.  However, in 2011, in the same desert between Mexico and Arizona used by 
the Garibaldi-Lopez operations, U.S. authorities conducted another major sting, 
Operation Pipeline Express, in which they arrested smugglers who, at the time of capture, 
were trafficking an estimated $33 million a month of drugs across the border.202  
Although two big anti-drug operations in a three-year period is significant, the most 
interesting discovery came from the evidence of how the cartels had learned and then 
adapted from Operation Tumbleweed.  In this case, after Operation Tumbleweed, in 
which smugglers utilized a coordination of scouts and vehicles to move drugs, authorities 
found that drugs were then moved via backpack across the same desert because humans 
were more difficult to find than trucks.  Even within days of Pipeline Express, authorities 
discovered another operation in the same general area that, by the time of discovery, had 
already moved $1.5 million of heroin and methamphetamine to a city north of Tucson.  
Instead of the major setback that the press conferences proclaimed, the DTOs 
immediately began studying how and why authorities were able to disrupt their 
smuggling activity, then resumed operations within the same general area using new 
techniques.203   
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Within the U.S., DTOs rely on subcontractors as part of their supply chain, 
and the creativity of each subcontracting business is usually only uncovered after a 
counterdrug operation takes place.  Numerous methods are used to distribute drugs, from 
continuing smuggling time of operations to operating under the cover of a legitimate 
company.  For instance, drug smugglers have been known to buy vehicles from police 
auctions and then use those cars to transport drugs.  Even though already inside the U.S., 
distributors still go to great lengths to hide the drugs.204  Even when caught, the 
traffickers would play dumb and blame the police’s inability to properly check all 
compartments before selling the car at the auction.205  Another method that also plays 
into plausible deniability is buying and trading vehicles between used car dealerships.  A 
DTO might own numerous dealerships, but each under a different name.  Car 
salespersons on the payroll would then buy and sell cars to each other, giving them an 
excuse to move cars through different parts of the country.  Access to numerous vehicles 
added a layer of security by always using a different car for each trip.206  If caught, the 
salesman would again deny knowledge of any illicit goods being inside the car, instead 
pleading that he was merely making a deal.  Yet another way to distribute drugs and limit 
personal risk occurs when smugglers put luggage full of drugs on a Greyhound bus 
without personally boarding.  If law enforcement intercepted the shipment, the authorities 
would have no one to blame.207   
Operating a legitimate business as a cover is the preferred method used by 
the drug cartels in the U.S. because it limits risk.  DTOs are aware of the red flags that 
show up when a vehicle is stolen or a crime is committed, therefore, once in the U.S. they 
favor legitimately buying vehicles or renting houses instead of stealing or committing 
crimes that would cause bystanders to call the police.208  However, the DTOs are still 
involved in criminal acts, especially in Mexico, where they have been known to hijack 
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commercial trucks and vehicles.209  Once in the U.S. and involved with the distribution 
and transportation of drugs, the DTOs prefer to operate under the cover of a legitimate 
business.  Another example of this type of operation that subcontractors have used is 
getting involved in the racehorse industry, which includes hiring a staff of groomers, 
trainers, veterinarians, and jockeys.  With enough people racing, breeding, buying, 
trading, and selling horses, it makes for a perfect cover for narcotic distribution by 
stuffing the wheel wells of the horse trailers with drugs.210 
These examples of legitimate business operations by cartels inside the 
borders of the U.S. shed light on how they move drugs to various markets.  DTOs and 
their subcontractors are only limited by their creativity to find a business and ability to 
maintain that business without drawing suspicion.  Eventually the drugs arrive to an area 
and are sold to their final distributor.  Some customers will actually purchase the drugs 
immediately after they leave the first stash house, then redistribute the drugs within their 
own network of stash houses, and supply chains.211  One example of this distribution that 
sheds light on current innovation is website called Silk Road.  It provides an anonymous 
venue that specializes in selling controlled substances.  This is one of many websites that 
are emerging; providing a new way for consumers to access illicit drugs and even 
minimize some of the supply-chain efforts of the cartels.212  In other cases, DTOs 
actually continue to maintain possession of the drugs, using subcontractors, until they are 
in the hands of the drug user.  This practice enables cartels to develop stronger roots in 
U.S. cities and reap the rewards from the high profit margins of selling drugs in small 
doses on street corners.  Often local gang members, under the watchful eye of a cartel 
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representative, carry out these contracts in U.S. cities.213  Figure 5 depicts the growing 
influence of Mexican drug cartels in different cities throughout the U.S. 
 
Figure 5.  Presence of Mexican Cartels in the U.S.214 
Utilizing their key resources, this section discussed how the drug 
trafficking business of DTOs provides and delivers value to their customers.  These 
cartels are in constant competition with each other for the illicit drug trade, and as 
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discussed earlier, control of a plaza brings in large profits.  The magnitude of intelligence 
that DTOs have access to helps them avoid disruption from authorities and other cartels.  
That insight also gives them the information needed to capitalize on weaknesses in 
security and other cartels.  Evidenced by the multiple U.S. operations in Arizona to 
disrupt drug trafficking, no sooner had federal agents stopped celebrating their drug bust 
before new smuggling operations resumed in the same area but with more evasive tactics.  
DTOs rely heavily on the human intellect of their employees and contractors to innovate 
and adapt so they can continue to outsmart and outmaneuver those seeking to disrupt the 
drug flow.  Additionally, the organizational structure and piecemealed operations add 
layers of security to a cartel and keep their secrets safe.  With numerous cells conducting 
parallel operations, DTOs mitigate risk and ensure that even the largest drug busts by 
authorities rarely have an impact on operations.  However, the information and activities 
that authorities do not know about yet are an even greater strength, as often it is not until 
a major drug bust that the complex operations of a cartel are uncovered. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The analytical framework for evaluating the drug trafficking business looked at 
how a DTO captures value.  High demand for drugs and the risks associated with moving 
drugs across the border make drug trafficking a lucrative business.  However, drug 
trafficking is only one of many business activities with which DTOs are involved.  
Chapter IV will look at money laundering though the lens of its CVP, profit formula, key 
resources, and key processes as an example of illicit goods that flow south.  There will be 
references to this Chapter on drug trafficking, and much of it will parallel the resources 
and processes of drug trafficking.  However, there are also differences when it comes to 
taking illicit profits and reintegrating them into the legitimate world.  Chapter IV will 
continue to build on the high risk, high reward associated with the illicit world and the 
push towards new innovations that make the Mexican DTOs so effective.   
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS TO MONEY 
LAUNDERING 
The previous Chapter not only demonstrated the ingenuity of drug smugglers, but 
also painted a picture of how lucrative drug trafficking activities can be for the 
organizations involved.  The high profit margins that come from successfully getting the 
drugs safely into the U.S. entice new people to enter the market and help drive innovation 
to stay ahead of authorities and competitors.  Although success is met with huge profits, 
failure brings incarceration or death.  However, once a drug such as cocaine makes it to 
its final destination, and that kilo, for which a cartel originally paid a little over $2,000, is 
divided into grams and sold on the street for about $100,000, the DTO that oversees the 
operation must still wait to be paid.  Transactions in the illicit market are usually 
conducted using cash, both on a retail level such as a city street and on a wholesale level 
such as the subcontractor who distributes cocaine to a region like Chicago, and moving 
that cash back to its business owners present a challenging problem.215   
In the following Chapter, this thesis will analyze the fundamental operation of 
money laundering, a key component required to return money to the drug cartels, as an 
example of illicit goods flowing south.  Although Mexican DTOs are engaged in other 
illicit operations going into Mexico, such as weapons trafficking, this researcher chose 
money laundering because it encompasses a significant aspect of a cartel’s livelihood; 
returning value from its illicit goods flowing north.  Using the same framework for 
analysis that examined drug trafficking as an example of illicit goods flowing north, 
money laundering will be examined through the lenses of CVP, profit formula, key 
resources, and key activities.  Because of the overlap of some common characteristics 
found in all DTO illicit operations, such as enforcement or subcontracting, there will be 
references to Chapter III, and this Chapter will focus on highlighting only the differences 
involved with illicit flow south.   
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A. CVP 
Just as with drug trafficking, in the activity of money laundering there must be an 
understanding of the customers, both in the sense of who they are and what they need.  
With regards to laundering money, the customers have to be able to return their illicit 
profits to the business owner, the sponsoring cartel.  To give an idea of the severity of the 
problem, imagine if a drug dealer gave an elementary school teacher a suitcase filled with 
$200,000 for an illicit activity with which both were involved.  The median pay for an 
elementary school teacher is slightly above $50,000, so that amount of cash would 
quadruple his salary in just one day.216  Initially the teacher might be extremely happy 
about the surplus of cash, but once he tried to deposit or spend it, problems would arise.  
Deposits or money transfers over $10,000 get reported to the U.S. government, and a 
quick investigation would reveal that without supporting documentation of legitimate 
sales or salary, a teacher should not suddenly have a surplus of cash.217  Additionally, 
financial institutions and money transfer companies, such as Western Union, are given 
guidelines that help employees recognize suspicious activities, such as making small 
deposits from a single location to numerous accounts.218  So, without the ability to put 
the money into a checking account, the teacher loses the capacity to use that money to 
pay credit card bills, utility bills, and mortgage or car payments, leaving him to use the 
cash to buy day-to-day items such as groceries.  Still, this does not sound like a bad thing, 
but then imagine the teacher no longer has his teaching job, so that cash becomes his 
salary.  How does he find a place to live or buy a car if all of his payments are conducted 
in cash?  Large cash payments would draw suspicion and scrutiny, and thus the teacher 
would have a big problem on his hands.  He has cash, but he has to figure out how to 
move that cash back into the formal economy without alerting authorities.  
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There in lies the huge problem in the deviant world: transactions are conducted in 
cash, and in the case of the Mexican DTOs, they need that cash returned to the legitimate 
economy so that they can put it to use.  Money laundering encompasses many techniques 
that help disguise the origins of the cash so that when it does reenter the financial 
markets, it appears as if the transactions are legitimate.  Additionally, bulk cash from 
drug sales is returned to Mexico and used to pay subcontractors and bribes, however 
without successful money laundering and bulk cash shipments south, their lucrative 
business of moving illicit goods and people north no longer returns value.219  These 
cartels are involved in numerous activities that support illicit goods flowing from Mexico 
into the U.S., and as Chapter III discussed, networks of subcontractors and innovative 
techniques increase the success of getting a product such as cocaine across the border.  
However, once the sale is complete, the money must be returned to the sponsoring 
organization.  As shown in Chapter III, the largest value addition in the cocaine supply 
chain takes place when the drug makes it across the U.S. border, which in turn means that 
there is a considerable amount of cash that must make it back into the hands of the cartel 
and move from the clandestine economy to the legitimate economy to complete the sale.  
For instance, revenue estimates from drug sales and human smuggling are upwards of 
$64 billion and $6 billion respectfully.220  According to a Department of State report, 
Mexican DTOs then move between $19 billion and $39 billion of those revenues in cash 
annually from the U.S. into Mexico.221  Moving such a significant amount of cash back 
to Mexico and transitioning it back to the legitimate economy is a problem, and thus 
cartels and their subcontractors become their own customers. 
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B. PROFIT FORMULA 
Little is known about the specific revenues and expenses associated with money 
laundering.  The activity in itself is meant to turn illicit profits, also known as dirty 
money, into clean money so that it can be transferred and used without alerting 
authorities.222  In doing so, the money changes hands many times in an effort to disguise 
previous transactions so that eventually money shows up in a bank account legitimately.  
Throughout this process, experts are paid to oversee the movement of these illicit 
finances, and similar to the drug trade, each person involved is paid for their services, 
either in drugs or cash.  Tracking those expenditures in a profession designed to hide and 
transfer money is nearly impossible.   
Based on the revenues from drug trafficking and human smuggling, an initial 
analysis reveals that of the approximate $70 billion in revenue, $30 billion to $50 billion 
is lost in the return to Mexico because of the State Department estimate that only $19 
billion to $39 billion is moved back across the border annually.  But this simple math 
does not take into account several other factors, such as money that takes a roundabout 
path to Mexico via the Middle East or revenues that are used to pay subcontractors and 
operations within the U.S. or that are wired directly to South America for additional 
cocaine purchases, all of which is almost impossible to track.  Instead, a sign of 
successful money laundering is the ability to make the illicit revenues disappear, where 
all that is left is a legitimate company that buys and sells goods and services in a legal 
market.  Thus, tracking specific revenues and expenses is extremely challenging within 
the activity of money laundering.223 
Similar to drug trafficking, however, there is a broader sense of revenues and 
expenses associated with the activity of money laundering.  For instance, DTOs 
subcontract with currency brokers and financial specialists that can help divvy up large 
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chunks of money so that the U.S. cannot track it.224  They also subcontract with 
smugglers who physically move bulk cash shipments out of the U.S., which remains the 
primary means of moving cash back to the specific drug cartel involved.225  Money 
launders also rely on the same network of subcontractors used in drug trafficking, such as 
legitimate businesses used for cover, stash houses, lookouts, and access to vehicles and 
other equipment.226 
An additional expense of laundering money is the risk associated with 
confiscation or capture.  For example, in 2010, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
seized over $100 million in bulk cash leaving the U.S.227  However, that amount is still 
less than half a percent of the low estimate and a quarter of a percent of the high estimate 
of the money smuggled across the border annually, hardly a loss to the organizations 
trying to collect their profits.  Subcontractors also face the same high risks as those 
involved with drug trafficking, such as incarceration from federal anti-money laundering 
operations or death should they have a run-in with a rival cartel, but these risks do not 
slow down the sustained operations of returning money to its rightful owner. 
The profits associated with money laundering are correlated to the illicit activity 
that produced the revenues, meaning that the ins are simply the return of revenues already 
made.  The activity of money laundering does not bring in additional profits, but simply 
returns the money from another illicit activities such as drug trafficking.  Without a 
successful money laundering operation, drug cartels would not be able to pay for things 
like assassinations or pay salaries for over half a million subcontractors in Mexico.228  
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Even the huge profit margin from cocaine sales on the streets of Chicago, estimated at 
5,000 percent when compared to the original purchase in the Andean Region, would no 
longer exist, and consequently could have a tremendous impact on a cartel’s survival.229  
Not all of the money returned to Mexico stays there though.  Estimates vary, but between 
50% to 80% of drug money is rerouted to purchase more illicit products and support 
other illicit activities, such as purchasing Cocaine in the Andean region and paying 
contractors and subcontractors.  Additionally, money is also moved to countries that use 
the U.S. dollar as currency, such as Panama, Ecuador, and El Salvador, because most of 
the cash is already in dollars.230 Thus, money laundering is a fundamental activity for 
Mexican drug cartels if they want to continue to have the means to support future illicit 
activities, bribe government officials, and fund operations along the border and into the 
U.S. 
C. KEY RESOURCES 
Money laundering requires a significant amount of trust and loyalty, similar to 
drug trafficking, because each shipment south contains the lifeblood of a cartel.  If a 
cartel had a significant problem with subcontractors stealing drugs moving north or 
money moving south then it could be at risk of losing everything.  Therefore DTOs 
utilize some of the same supply and distribution chains already in place from moving 
illicit products north.  The infrastructure of subcontractors, networks, and equipment 
described in Chapter III is proven and successful, so smugglers tap into these established 
supply chains that move drugs north for the majority of bulk cash shipments returning to 
Mexico.231  However, money laundering does rely on different technologies and 
innovations to help clean the money so that DTOs can legally access their money. 
Some of these key resources are the same machines and technologies that are 
designed for the formal economy.  Since legitimate companies already have a median 
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from which money can be easily moved, deviant entrepreneurs seek to exploit these 
technological and institutional advances that have been developed in conjunction with 
globalization.232  For example, the Internet provides a simple way to set up wire transfers 
and ATMs now have access to bank accounts from almost anywhere in the world, both of 
which can make it easy to deposit money at one site and withdraw it from a different 
location.233  Even prepaid cash cards, which will be discussed in more detail within key 
processes, can now store monetary values upwards of a million dollars on a small 
microchip without any government oversight, and thus permit a smuggler to easily move 
large amounts of stored money across the border in just a wallet.234 
To oversee these operations and ensure dirty money is funneled through the 
appropriate channels, the DTOs rely on the financial expertise of its subcontractors.  
These people, sometimes referred to as currency brokers, have the ability to “divide a 
large sum [of money] into numerous small amounts that are virtually unnoticeable and 
can be aggregated at the receiving end.”235  These people are well trained, innovative, 
and are willing to work in the deviant world.  Additionally, they understand the 
advantage globalization gives them and look towards advances in trade-agreements 
throughout the world for new opportunities to move illicit goods, and money, through 
multiple channels so that it is eventually either cleaned or returned to its intended 
destination.    
The rest of the key resources used for money laundering overlap with those 
involved in the flow of illicit goods north.  The expansive networks, along with access to 
enforcement, are utilized in most illicit activities performed by the cartels.  The next 
section will highlight how the key resources of money laundering are used to deliver 
money back to the DTOs. 
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D. KEY PROCESSES 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) describes three basic steps 
that must take place to successfully launder money: “1) Placement—placing, through 
deposits or other means, unlawful proceeds into the financial system, 2) Layering—
separating proceeds of criminal activity from their origin through the use of layers of 
complex financial transactions, and 3) Integration—using additional transactions to create 
the appearance of legality through the purchase of assets.”236  If done successfully, dirty 
money becomes untraceable and turns into legitimate, clean money, often with 
documentation representative of legitimate transfers or transactions.  However, as federal 
authorities continue to implement new anti-laundering policies, subcontractors must 
innovate and adapt to ensure that cash continues to flow south and supports the 
sponsoring DTO and its activities.  To capitalize on the revenues produced from illicit 
activities flowing north, money is returned to its owners using two primary methods: bulk 
cash shipments, which involve moving cash from the U.S. back to Mexico; and washing 
money, which involves taking the cash from illicit sales and cleaning it so it can reenter 
the financial markets.  The following section will shed light on the techniques and 
innovations that the cartels use to profit from their illicit revenues. 
1. Bulk Shipments across the Border 
Much of what authorities know about money laundering is from confiscations or 
arrests, and the techniques utilized by smugglers is only limited to that person’s 
creativity.  For instance, at the Mexican border, agents have found money hidden in 
“cars, dolls, television sets, and shipments of refrigerated bull semen.”237  The most 
successful innovations that subcontractors use are those that have yet to be discovered.  
However, some techniques, such as moving bulk cash shipments across the Mexican 
border, have been in place since the early days of money laundering and continue to be 
the primary method chosen by subcontractors.  Once revenues from drug sales are 
created, cash is taken to stash houses that redistribute the money to counting houses 
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around the U.S.  These houses are strategically located in major U.S. cities, such as Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta, to provide quick routing of cash once a drug sale is made.  
Cash is converted to $50 and $100 bills to minimize bulk and then vacuum-sealed to 
make it easier to hide and pack into small compartments.  Utilizing some of the same 
vehicles and secret compartments used to traffic drugs across the border and around the 
U.S., the cash is hidden in places like the wheel well, behind the airbag, and many other 
compartments that can hide money without drawing suspicion.  The cash is then shipped 
south, again taking advantage of the supply routes already carved out from the drug 
trade.238 
Bulk cash shipments are less complex than splitting up money and rerouting it 
through multiple forms, but they also expose the cartel to more risk of losing a large 
amount of revenue if intercepted.  To alleviate that risk, shipments are divided up 
amongst several vehicles, with an average vehicle carrying between $150,000 and 
$500,000, and the vehicles and drivers are constantly rotated as to not draw suspicion 
from authorities.  If the lead vehicle approaches a surprise border patrol stop, or has 
trouble with authorities along the route, the remaining vehicles will either change routes 
or hold their position.  Even if one of the vehicles has its cash confiscated and loses 
$500,000, that amount is still less than one hundredth of a percent of the $19 billion being 
moved across the border each year, hardly a disruption to any cartel.239  As the shipment 
approaches the Mexican border, subcontractors must decide whether to attempt to drive 
the vehicle through a legitimate entry point or to smuggle the money along the same 
route used to move illicit goods north.  
In the past, cash shipments would be delivered to a final stash house near the 
Mexican border and be refitted to travel along a plaza, either by vehicle or foot.  Mules, 
or “individuals paid to carry bills,” would then move the cash through a drug trafficking 
plaza or through a border checkpoint.240  However, DTOs have revised their tactics 
because law enforcement started tracking packing equipment and money counting 
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machines used in preparation for a mules’ trip south.  To avoid the newfound focus of 
law enforcement, subcontractors adapted to driving vehicles, usually the same vehicles 
used to smuggle drugs north, through a border checkpoint and into Mexico.241  Another 
method used by subcontractors that demonstrates their ingenuity is to ship the cash via 
FedEx and DHL, a technique that circumvents Border Patrol operations all together.242 
The network of people paid by the DTO to facilitate the flow of goods from one 
side of the border to the other play a crucial role in helping smugglers avoid detection.  
For instance, lookouts, also known as halcones, watch the flow of traffic across the main 
entry points into Mexico, including monitoring specific traffic lanes for the number of 
searches, amount of time sitting in line, and any other unusual or unpredictable behavior.  
These halcones then communicate back to the drivers in the U.S., along with their 
counterparts on the Mexican side that facilitate the northern flow of illicit goods, to give 
smugglers the best chance of successfully driving the money through a border checkpoint 
and into Mexico.243  This coordination, in conjunction with difficult to monitor 
communication techniques, gives smugglers a significant advantage against border patrol.  
A 2009 NDIC report captured the complexity of this type of network: 
Several Mexican DTOs maintain cross border communication centers in 
Mexico near the U.S.–Mexico border to facilitate coordinated cross-border 
smuggling operations. These centers are staffed by DTO members who 
use an array of communication methods, such as Voice over Internet 
Protocol, satellite technology (broadband satellite instant messaging), 
encrypted messaging, cell phone technology, two-way radios, scanner 
devices, and text messaging, to communicate with members. In some 
cases DTO members use high frequency radios with encryption and 
rolling codes to communicate during cross-border operations.244 
Although this type of bulk smuggling sounds simple, it demonstrates the 
innovative side to money laundering.  As discussed in Chapter III, smugglers and drug 
cartels adapt to measures put in place to defeat their operations.  For instance, DTOs used 
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to move money to pre-designated stash houses close to the border and then repack the 
money for a trip across the border using the same routes that moved the drugs into the 
U.S.245  However, because authorities focused attention on tracking who bought tools 
and supplies required for moving money through the desert, money smugglers adapted 
and moved their operations to within plain sight of Border Patrol Agents and began 
driving large shipments across the border.  These smugglers understood that on average, 
officials from the U.S. and Mexico only searched ten percent of the vehicles entering 
Mexico, so they had a better chance of moving cash through a checkpoint than trying to 
move it across the desert.246  Additionally, driving across the border allowed them to take 
advantage of all the government agencies focusing on illicit goods entering the U.S.  For 
example, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, in 2011, approximately 5-
million trucks, 61-million cars, and 40-million pedestrians by foot crossed the U.S.-
Mexico border moving north, meaning that while U.S. and Mexican officials were 
focused on preventing illicit goods from crossing the border north, money smugglers are 
able to move south without much concern.247  
With advances in technology and the addition of trade agreements, bulk cash 
shipments can now be made without physically carrying money.  As banks try to keep up 
with globalization and rush to expand services that reach more customers, new 
technologies have emerged that allow quick transactions to take place between customers 
that span across many borders.  However, these expansions have also made it more 
challenging for law enforcement agencies to monitor transactions across numerous 
jurisdictions.248  One such device that has grown in popularity amongst smugglers is a 
prepaid access card, which is a plastic card, similar to a credit card.  Governments, both 
in the U.S. and Mexico, do not monitor how these cards are used or the amount of money 
stored on them, meaning that smugglers do not have to worry about getting reported for 
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deposits exceeding $10,000.249  Even if caught with a prepaid access card, there is no 
way for law enforcement to differentiate between its value being legitimate or 
illegitimate, and they lack the authority to “freeze and seize the assets” from the card.250  
This type of financial instrument does not even have to be declared at a border 
checkpoint, thus giving money smugglers the ability to move virtual cash south to 
Mexico without drawing attention or fear of confiscation.251    
Numerous types of prepaid access cards are in existence with different levels of 
complexity.  Some cards are considered gift cards that can be found in drug stores and 
supermarkets, where the user places a dollar amount on a card and then makes purchases 
until the card is empty.  Even if the card is found, the contents cannot be read without the 
proper scanner or software, plus, the card is not assigned to an individual, but instead 
anonymous, meaning that it can be passed between users and then accessed once safely 
within Mexico.252  Other cards have a scanner or computer chip in them and can be 
reloaded using a computer or ATM, which allows the smuggler to carry an entire bank 
account across the border inconspicuously.  For example, a legitimate company called 
RushCard combines the services of a traditional bank account with the convenience of a 
credit by offering consumers a prepaid Visa that is accepted worldwide and can be used 
to pay bills, transfer money online, and even make withdrawals.253  
Just as bulk cash smugglers look for innovations that allow the movement of 
money south using vehicles and foot travelers, they also look towards exposing advances 
in globalization and the technology advances made to bring world markets closer 
together.  As Nils Gilman said, “Capital mobility across national borders improves the 
efficiency with which the global economy allocates investment,” but it also makes “the 
laundering of money from other illicit activities for criminal far easier, and much more 
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challenging for political authorities to address.”254  Thus, stored access cards are yet 
another example of the innovative techniques used by smugglers to circumvent the 
barriers erected by law enforcement.  Additionally, numerous contractors are involved in 
the activity of returning bulk cash shipments to the cartels, and just as in drug trafficking, 
these cells operate independent of each other to provide the cartel with a level of 
resilience and security.  However, not all money is returned in bulk, and as the next 
section will outline, some of it must be cleaned so that it can return to the legitimate 
economy. 
2. Cleaning Money 
Moving cash from the U.S. back to Mexico helps return profits to the drug cartels, 
but drug trafficking revenues must also be cleaned so that it can re-enter the legal 
financial markets.  This is especially true in light of more stringent policies put in place 
by the Mexican government that forbid large payments using cash for real estate 
exceeding 500,000 pesos ($38,750) and other items such as cars and boats exceeding 
200,000 pesos ($15,500).  DTOs must do more than return bulk cash to their stash houses 
in Mexico if they want to use that money to continue operations.255  Additionally, once 
money reenters the legitimate market, it can be used to support key resources in the U.S. 
and Mexico such as operating a legitimate business used to disguise illicit activities or 
purchasing and operating stash houses and vehicles.  The methods used to clean money 
vary, but they again shed light on the ingenuity and innovativeness that encapsulates 
Mexican DTOs. 
One fairly common technique involves purchasing big box items in the U.S. and 
then reselling those items in Mexico.  For instance, a subcontractor who sells appliances 
or cars would use the revenues from drug sales to buy refrigerators, TVs, and sometimes 
even used cars, and then transport those items back to a retail store in Mexico.  Once in 
Mexico, those items would be sold through a legitimate business, and the pesos generated 
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from the sale could then be used legitimately.  This practice allows the money to be 
cleaned by simply changing forms, in this case its changed to an appliance, and then 
resold to either the Mexican population or to yet another business who sells the goods 
through a store.  Once the money is cleaned, it can be accessed by the drug cartel.256 
Another method combines bulk cash shipments with money cleaning to add more 
layers of security and complexity to the money laundering process.  Known as the Black 
Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), the revenues from drug sales are entrusted to a currency 
broker who uses a favorable exchange rate to make a legitimate profit that can be 
returned to the drug cartels.257  The Department of the Treasury defines the BMPE as “a 
large-scale money laundering system used to launder proceeds of narcotic sales in the 
United States by Latin American drug cartels by facilitating swaps of dollars in the U.S. 
for pesos in Colombia through the sale of dollars to Latin American businessmen seeking 
to buy U.S. goods to export.”258  This complex method was originally implemented my 
Columbian drug cartels, but today is utilized by Mexican DTOs seeking ways to clean 
dirty money.259  In the example outlined in Figure 6, bulk cash from illicit sales is 
shipped back to Mexico and exchanged for pesos at a discounted rate.  The peso 
exchange company then uses the surplus of dollars to buy products, such as perfume or 
electronics, in the U.S., and then ships those products to purchasers in Mexico.  Once 
those products are then sold in Mexico, the revenues are turned over to the sponsoring 
drug cartel, but now their cash is clean and has the proper transactions to support its 
reentry into the formal economy.260  As recent as February 2013, the Department of 
Justice reported prosecuting a launderer who moved over $20 million from drug sales 
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back to Mexico using the BMPE.261  Additionally, this method gained notoriety when 
HSBC Bank, an international bank headquartered in London, facilitated the laundering of 
almost $900 million of drug revenues through the U.S. financial system back to the 
Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle Cartel in Colombia, of which a 
significant portion involved BMPE.262   
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Figure 6.  Black Market Peso Exchange.263 
                                                 




Other ways to clean money involve multiple, complex transactions conducted by 
a currency broker.  These specialists will divide up the money into small amounts and 
then deposit the funds into hundreds of bank accounts throughout the world.264  The 
money is then shifted around between accounts, making it nearly impossible to track, 
until it ends up back in the Cartel’s bank account without setting off any red flags.  In one 
example a broker moved $36 million of cocaine sales back to Mexico by spreading the 
money amongst 68 bank accounts in nine different countries.  The money can then be 
returned to use in the financial markets without being questioned as dirty money.265   
An even bolder method used by launders is for them to own and operate their own 
bank, thus giving them access to countless accounts to funnel money back to Mexico.  
For instance, countries such as Russia or Nigeria make it relatively simple to buy a bank.  
Or, on the Pacific Island country of Nauru, for about $25,000, an organization can 
establish its own bank.266  These banks help clean money by bypassing the reporting 
measures that the U.S. and Mexico have in place, and thus allow the money to be moved 
through different bank accounts without regulation.  However, when oversight does exist, 
money launderers will operate under the guise of a legitimate business.      
Drug cartel money managers also clean money through legitimate businesses 
throughout the world, such as gambling and online video games.267  With access to the 
Internet and the ease of transferring funds, these companies allow dirty money to be 
gambled away, while on the opposite end the money is reported as profit for the casino.  
Or, if using a virtual role-playing video game, such as Farmville, real currency can be 
used to purchase game-based currency, again allowing a company to record profits from 
the dirty money that now appears legitimate.268  In both cases, the cartel subcontracts 
with the legitimate business so that the actors on both sides of the transactions are being 
supported by a DTO.  These types of transactions blur the line between licit and illicit 
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transactions, and thus make it relatively simple for money to be quickly cleaned and 
returned to a cartel as profit.269  Launderers are even well versed in the rules and 
regulations in different countries and use that knowledge to their advantage.  For 
example, in the Caribbean, trust account owners can remain anonymous, thus giving 
cartels access to an account where a simple deposit cleans money for future use.270  
However, even though these fronts serve as a method for cleaning the money, the funds 
must still be transferred.  
3. Money Transfer 
Money transfer has been around for a considerable amount of time.  The origins 
of Western Union’s money transfer business date back to the 1870s, and in 2006 alone it 
handled 147 million consumer-to-consumer transactions.271  Through all of these 
legitimate transactions, money launderers are merely “tiny needles in a huge haystack,” 
which gives them a significant advantage of blending in as long as they avoid schemes 
that draw attention.272  When money is sent out of the U.S., as long as the amount is 
under $1,000, then the transfer company only requires the sender’s name.  This lax 
regulation means that a state or federally issued identification is not needed, nor does the 
sender have to give an address or phone number.  Additionally, the company only needs 
the name of the recipient, and if the transfer is leaving the U.S., the wire company has no 
interest in the background or qualifications of the receiver.273  So, even if the contractor 
receiving the payment in Mexico has a criminal record or a history of working for the 
drug cartels, the money transfer company would never know.   
To successfully transfer money, currency brokers and money managers structure 
the payments, meaning that they divide up the illicit revenues into small amounts and 
make separate transactions to a receiving agent.  The small payments, less than $1,000, 
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allow launderers to use fictitious names on both ends of the transaction while avoiding 
the $10,000 reporting requirement.274  Additionally, launderers have learned from 
previous anti-money laundering operations that if they make numerous small transfers 
between the same locations over and over again, their actions will draw attention from 
Federal Agents.  To evade authorities, they will even transfer money to different 
locations within the U.S. before finally wiring it out of the country.  A final area of 
weakness that the money launderers have tapped into is the organization of the wire-
transfer companies themselves.  Most wire-transfer companies subcontract with local 
store employees, meaning that the clerk that handles the transfer actually works for the 
convenience store or grocery store that host the wire-transfer companies.  Additionally, 
these stores will sometimes host numerous wire-transfer companies, which gives a 
launderer the ability to send multiple, small transfers of different amounts that are split 
between different wire-transfer companies.275  This level of structuring makes the money 
nearly impossible to track and gives an appearance of being legitimate from the receiving 
end.  Although tedious and time consuming, it allows a money launderer to clean dirty 
money in small amounts spread over numerous transactions and accounts.  It also allows 
the launderer to wire money legally to a legitimate business outside the U.S., adding yet 
another layer of security to the money washing process. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter encompassed different key processes that enable subcontractors to 
return illicit profits to the drug cartels.  These DTOs already have the framework in place 
that enables the movement of illicit goods both north and south.  So, as highlighted in 
their key processes, the DTOs look towards innovators that can challenge existing 
barriers put in place by law enforcement.  Once a new process is created, it is continually 
used until new barriers or policies are put in place, and then once again subcontractors 
adapt and innovate in order to succeed.  Using two primary methods to return money to 
the cartels, bulk cash smuggling and money washing, cartels rely on some of the same 
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key resources and processes utilized in their drug trafficking activities.  By tapping into 
this network, cartels are able to effectively return the profits from illicit sales so they can 
continue supporting future operations.  The reward of doing so is significant, in that the 
cartel capitalizes on its lucrative drug trafficking or human smuggling activities, but the 
risk of failure is still extremely high.  Not only do contractors face the threat of death or 
incarceration, a cartel risks losing its lifeblood, money, if it cannot capture value from its 
illicit activities.  The severity of this threat will continue to drive innovation.   
Going back at the example used in the beginning of this Chapter, a teacher with a 
suitcase full of $200,000 in cash, money laundering solves the problem of being able to 
use that cash in the legitimate economy.  Without successful laundering techniques, that 
teacher would be stuck with cash and have a difficult time using it to make large 
purchases.  Within the deviant economy, money laundering is a fundamental activity that 
becomes the single point of failure for conducting illicit business activities, especially as 
new regulations make it even more challenging for people to use cash to make expensive 
purchases.  Cash earned in the deviant world must be cleaned and returned to the formal 
economy for the deviant entrepreneur to actually see his or her profits.  For the drug 
cartels, money laundering is a vital business activity that completes the transactions from 
other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, by returning usable cash to the DTOs.  If 
policies and law enforcement are able to stop money laundering, then the cash flow that 
feeds the drug cartels will stop, and thus lead to less powerful cartels.  However, as 
shown in these past two chapters, the cartels continue to innovate and adapt, so even with 
the most successful anti-laundering techniques in the works, the DTOs will merely come 
up with new ways to side step authorities and continue to feed their powerful business.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Mexican DTOs remain a significant threat to the United States by continuing 
to feed its deviant markets with goods and services that very few organizations can offer.  
Even with measures in place to disrupt their illicit activities, such as new policies by the 
American and Mexican governments that require large cash purchases or money transfers 
to be reported, sophisticated border fences designed to notify authorities of movement 
across desolate areas of the border, or law enforcement operations with the sole intent of 
seeking out and eliminating stash houses, Mexican drug cartels and their operators 
continue to succeed by capturing value in various illicit markets and returning those 
funds back to Mexico.   
Numerous studies have been conducted on the Mexican DTOs in the context of 
drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, and human smuggling.  Additionally, vast amounts 
of business model literature exist that cover strategy and business model ideas that give a 
company the tools it needs to create and capture value.276  However, there is a gap when 
it comes to applying a business analysis to the drug cartels.  Some literature does 
approach the topic of the drug cartels behaving as a legitimate business in the context of 
their managerial positions, including having their own accountants, money managers, 
lawyers, and purchasing agents, but beyond simply pointing out those similarities, little 
research has been done on how they run their business, including strategies and business 
practices.277  Thus, this thesis filled the void that exists in that area of research, and hopes 
to establish a greater interest in how these cartels operate their multinational companies 
so successfully. 
Before a business and strategy analysis can be applied to the drug cartels, this 
thesis first established what would be analyzed within the drug cartel business.  These 
cartels operate numerous business activities that combine to make the drug cartels the 
business that they are today.  Each activity serves a purpose, from producing revenues to 
                                                 
276 Zott, “The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research,” 1–3. 
277 Campbell, Drug War Zone, 18. 
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supporting the activities that bring in that revenue.  More specifically, some of the 
revenue producing activities includes drug trafficking, human smuggling, and extortion, 
and some of the supporting activities include enforcement, bribery, and coercion.  
Additionally, at the core of all illicit revenues is the activity of money laundering so that 
cash can be returned to the cartels in a usable form.  If studied collectively, these 
activities might seem to go in multiple directions, sometimes with overlap, but often 
times without rhyme or reason as to why a specific activity is performed.  However, 
when analyzed individually, a clearer picture emerges of how the cartels utilize different 
activities for different facets of their operation that all fit into an overall system; each 
with a specific task that ties into the bigger picture of capturing value from the dark 
economy.   
With the significant profits that exist in the drug trade, along with the academic 
literature written on different aspects of that trade, this thesis analyzed drug trafficking as 
an example of an illicit activity that produced revenues and encompassed a majority of 
supporting activities.  To compliment this business activity, this thesis also analyzed 
money laundering because of its vital role in returning illicit profits to the drug cartels 
and the formal economy.  By isolating and then applying a framework of analysis to these 
two core activities, the effective business practices of the Mexican DTOs began to 
surface. 
The framework for analysis applied in this thesis revolved around a study of 
business models.  These models relate to how a business activity creates, delivers, and 
captures value.  At the heart of any business model is providing a product or service that 
solves customers’ problems and prevents them from either purchasing the product from 
someone else or completing the task themselves. Typically there is a reason customers 
are looking for a solution in the first place, and that is the inability to solve the problem 
on their own because of insufficient wealth, access, skills, or time.  Next, a business 
model provides an overview of the revenues and expenses of operating a business 
activity, which includes the cash flow from supporting activities as well.  Finally, a 
business model highlights what assets are required to deliver the value to the customer 
and how those assets are used.  These four parts combine to form the analytical 
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framework of this thesis from which the Mexican DTOs were studied in the context of 
their two core business activities, drug trafficking and money laundering. 
This thesis produced two hypotheses in Chapter I when answering the research 
question of what are the effective business practices of the Mexican DTOs: 
(1) Mexican DTOs must rely on innovative problem solving if they want 
to overcome policies in place designed to disrupt their activities.  If they 
fail to innovate and adapt, they will quickly find themselves up against the 
barriers set forth by law enforcement, which eventually lead to extinction.  
Additionally, these innovations add value by providing more efficient 
ways to move illicit products across a controlled border or territory, and 
thus lead to even higher profit margins.  However, innovation does not 
necessarily mean that drug cartels are only relying on new technology and 
equipment, which although is an important aspect, they are also 
continuously solving a supply chain problem by moving illicit goods north 
and south through an ever changing barrier of government policies and 
law enforcement.278 
(2) Mexican DTOs must demonstrate high-level degrees of organizational 
resilience if they want to survive in the deviant world and operate a highly 
profitable business.  To achieve this level of resiliency, DTOs have an 
organizational structure that protects the core of the cartel while multiple 
contractors and subcontractors accept the personal risk associated with its 
illicit activities.  These multiple cells often conduct simultaneous 
operations with very little knowledge about other contractors or the 
operation itself, which helps limit exposure should law enforcement or 
rival cartels apprehend some of the contractors.  This organizational 
strategy also helps the DTOs keep their hands in multiple business 
activities and thus limit financial risk through minimal exposure.  These 
activities are capable of expanding and contracting based on the 
opportunities and constraints of the market, so they can maximize their 
profits while others assume the personal risk.279 
Through an application of the framework for analysis to the business activities of 
drug trafficking and money laundering, a couple of overlapping strategies and business 
practices began to emerge.   
First, on a fundamental level, drug cartels must control the supply chain routes 
through Mexico and across the border.  Without control of these routes, a cartel would 
                                                 
278 Nieto-Gomez, “The Geopolitics of Clandestine Innovation in the Drug Business,” 153. 
279 Michael Kenney, “The Architecture of Drug Trafficking,” 235–237. 
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lack the ability to control the flow of illicit goods, to include taxing other organizations or 
smuggling their own products across the border, and thus be cut out of the value addition 
that these illicit products receive when they cross the border.  Additionally, if they did 
have access to drugs such as cocaine, they would be at the mercy of another cartel to use 
its territory, and thus would become a subcontractor of that cartel rather than running its 
own enterprise.  Finally, Mexican DTOs are showing evidence of expanding their control 
over the entire supply chain.  As presented in Chapter III, value is added to cocaine along 
its route as it moves from the Andes to the streets of the U.S., and each time value is 
added, someone is taking a cut of that revenue.  However, if a cartel can keep its hand in 
that process throughout the entire shipment, then it reaps a bigger reward and is not 
limited to just the revenues that come with moving that product through its territory and 
across the border.  So, if a cartel gets cut out of part or all of that supply-chain, it stands 
to lose out on a lot of potential profits, and might even find itself extinct.  In addition to 
the value addition being so important to earning revenues, control of the supply chain 
routes also helps the cartel return cash to Mexico.  Although numerous methods exist that 
help move money from the dark economy back to the formal economy, a number of those 
methods involve getting the cash out of the U.S.  Finally, the cartels have greater control 
of their cash stockpiles hidden in stash houses in Mexico rather than the U.S.  This gives 
them the ability to use that cash to support other illicit activities, such as bribery, so 
controlling supply chain routes is a significant part of capturing value that involves 
Mexican DTO illicit business activities. 
Even with control of supply chain routes, Mexican DTOs undergo constant battles 
with law enforcement and rival cartels.  From a law enforcement and policy standpoint, 
governments are continuously refining processes designed to dismantle and disrupt the 
cartels and their supply chain routes.  To overcome these obstacles, the cartels turn to 
innovation in both their actions and their organization.  This arms race between Mexican 
DTOs and law enforcement continues to push each side to develop new strategies and 
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policies that overcome the other.280  However, at the end of the day, neither side ends up 
improving their advantage vis-à-vis each other.281  For example, a drug cartel and its 
contractors approach the government created obstacles as problems that must be solved.  
Hence, once a new barrier is created, smugglers adapt and figure out a new way to move 
a product from one side of the border to the other without being caught.  Additionally, the 
reward for solving this type of supply-chain problem can bring a smuggler a year’s salary 
in just one trip.282  This lucrative business also entices entrepreneurs to enter the illicit 
market and offer the cartels a new way to move drugs or cash across the border, such as a 
submersible, that is capable of bypassing all law enforcement barriers.  Thus, with such 
huge financial incentives, the drug trade has expanded beyond uneducated, poorly trained 
smugglers, and now includes intelligent, innovative, and sometimes well-educated 
entrepreneurs who are searching for their next big opportunity. 
These smugglers and entrepreneurs are not actual Mexican DTO members 
though; they work as contractors and subcontractors.  This type of organization is 
innovative in its own right because of its reflection of an adaptation to the violent and 
risky world of which these business activities take place.  As highlighted in the previous 
paragraph, the reward for successfully delivering an illicit product to the customer is 
lucrative and can include profit margins that exceed four digits.  However, on the 
opposite side of the spectrum, if a business activity fails, its members could face torture 
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and death or incarceration.  These consequences far exceed the risks seen within 
legitimate companies, in which on the extreme end failure means bankruptcy or 
unemployment, but not death.  Thus, cartels have adopted an organizational structure in 
response to this type of extreme risk so that the people who are assuming the greatest 
personal risk are not actually DTO members at all, but instead are contractors. 
This type of organizational structure complements the innovativeness that 
characterizes successful cartels because when the risk of failure has such harsh 
consequences, those people who assume the personal risk will do everything in their 
power to innovate and overcome whatever threat stands in their way.  Mexican drug 
cartels operate by paying numerous contractors to conduct simultaneous business 
activities as a way to limit exposure to the DTO when moving illicit products.  
Additionally, they compartmentalize the information cartels give to various contractors, 
so that even if some of the contractors are captured, they have very little knowledge about 
the operation, thus making it challenging for law enforcement or a rival cartel to disrupt 
future operations.   
A reflection of this type of organizational structure and innovativeness can be 
seen in how Apple operates its App Store.  Apple has an already established 
infrastructure in place because of its other business activities and wants to use that 
foundation to offer consumers the ability to download Apps that are designed to make 
day-to-day activities easier.  In order to meet the demands of its customers while still 
maintaining its innovative edge, it encourages third party App designers, or contractors, 
to develop new Apps and sell them on its App Store.  To entice these developers, it offers 
access to its infrastructure for free, with just a 30 percent charge on revenues from App 
downloads.  Thus, with a customer base of over 500-million people, if an App is 
successful, it has the potential to make millions of dollars in revenue, from which both 
the developer and Apple profit.  However, if an App fails, Apple does not stand to lose 
anything but the developer loses all the time and money invested in the project.  So, tying 
the App Store into the Mexican DTOs, these cartels have an infrastructure in place; they 
control the routes, they have the supporting activities such as enforcement and bribery 
that limit disruptions along their supply chains, but they need smugglers, innovators, 
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entrepreneurs, and money launderers to assume the personal risk associated with their 
revenue producing business activities. 
Both Apple and the DTOs provide a platform that organizes and encourages the 
innovative work of others.  This is known as a two-sided network in that it provides an 
infrastructure that brings two groups together; one side is subsidized so that it attracts 
enough users while the other side, which values the number of subsidized users, is willing 
to pay top dollar to reach those users.283  For example, the drug cartels subsidize 
contractors to smuggle and transport drugs into and throughout the U.S.  The subsidies 
include significant financial gain, especially when contractors earn the trust and 
confidence to be able to move large shipments of drugs without being caught.  On the 
other side of the network, drug distributors and drug users in the U.S. are willing to pay 
top dollar to access those drugs.  The DTOs simply provide the platform that brings these 
two groups together.  Within that platform, cartels spur innovation by offering 
performance-based subsidies, in the form of money and drugs, to the contractors.  The 
harsh personal risk that those contractors face, coupled with the increase in pay that 
comes with proven success, helps push those contractors toward new ways to overcome 
law enforcement barriers.   
So, to answer the question of what are the effective business practices of the 
Mexican DTOs: this thesis extracted three strategies that are common among their 
business activities.  The first one, control of supply chain routes, was not part of the 
original hypothesis, but is crucial to both business activities analyzed in this thesis.  The 
second and third business practices come from the hypothesis associated with 
innovativeness and organization.  And, evidenced through the analysis of drug trafficking 
and money laundering, these two business practices allow a cartel to overcome barriers 
and maintain a level of organizational resilience, both of which are an important part of 
operating in the deviant world. 
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A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
When conducting an analysis on the price data of cocaine within the United 
States, some enlightening information began to emerge.  Within the deviant world, it is 
no surprise that cocaine increases in value as it passes through high-risk areas, such as 
crossing the border.  Additionally, once smugglers successfully move cocaine to the U.S., 
generally the price should increase relative to the distance traveled from the border 
because of the added time and resources to move the product within the supply chain.  
For instance, similar to shipping a package via UPS or FedEx, as cocaine moves from 
San Diego to New York City, more people might have a hand in the supply chain and 
thus the product becomes more expensive.  However, two interesting aspects came to 
light when I began to plot the wholesale price of a kilo of cocaine in different U.S. cities, 
which can be seen in Figure 7 as a replication of the map from Chapter III, something 
that to our knowledge has yet to be portrayed in academic or government publications. 
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Figure 7.  Cocaine Wholesale Prices.284 
First, there is about a 100 percent price increase between the wholesale price of 
cocaine along the southwest border and its wholesale price in the northeast.  Beyond a 
couple anomalies in Montana and St. Louis, the highest value of cocaine is found in the 
northeast.  As a way to analyze this price information in a different context, I conducted a 
regression analysis by examining the correlation between the wholesale prices of cocaine 
versus the distance traveled from points of entry.  The 2011 National Drug Threat 
Assessment lists the main entry points for Cocaine as Southern California and South 
Texas, as seen in Figure 8.285 
                                                 
284 Graphic designed by Daniel LeRoy and Robert Kurrle, Jr. using data from the National Drug 
Intelligence Center, “National Illicit Drug Prices,” December 2008. 
285 “2011 National Drug Threat Assessment,” 19. 
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Figure 8.  Cocaine Transportation Routes.286 
So using the main entry points of San Diego and Laredo, along with Google Maps 
as a method to estimate distances, I calculated a linear regression using the state averages 
from Figure 7: 
                                                 
286 “Internal Cocaine Movement, FY2008-FY2010,” in “2011 National Drug Threat Assessment,” 19. 
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Figure 9.  Wholesale Price of Cocaine versus Distance from Border.287 
The R-squared value, or correlation between price and distance, for cocaine that 
enters through Sothern California is 0.49213.  This means that the price of cocaine and 
the distance traveled from the border are highly correlated, hence as distance increases 
                                                 
287 Data derived from 2008 “National Illicit Drug Prices.” 
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from the border, so does the price.  Next, I conducted a more thorough regression 
analysis that just focused on the San Diego border, which produced Table 1: 
 
Table 1.   Regression Analysis for the San Diego Border.288 
An adjusted R-squared value, which compensates for added variables, is 0.48133 
and therefore still indicates a high correlation between distance and price.  Significant to 
this output are the coefficients of 4.42, which is the price multiplier, based on the distance 
from the border, and 14722.48, which is the base price at the San Diego border based on 
all of the inputs.  So using these two coefficients, an equation can be derived, base price + 
price multiplier x distance traveled, that predicts the price of cocaine anywhere in the 
U.S.  For example, the predicted price of cocaine in New York would be $14722.48 + 
($4.42/mile) x (2,883 miles), which equals $27,478, only a $311 difference from the state 
average.  Using the same formula for Iowa predicts a price that is only $4 different than 
the actual state average.  There are some anomalies in price that do not correlate to 
distance that can be pointed out on figure 7, such as Montana, Kansas, Wyoming, South 
Dakota, and Florida, of which the equation will not work.  However, this tool can give 
                                                 
288 Data derived from 2008 “National Illicit Drug Prices.” 
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law enforcement the ability to predict drug prices throughout the U.S. and monitor local 
price changes relative to other areas.  
For the cocaine entering through South Texas, the correlation is less, with a R-
squared value of 0.255.  However, from South Texas, cocaine that is distributed to the 
Midwest and West coast markets may also be supplied through San Diego and thus 
would throw off the distance correlation.  However, assuming some cocaine does cross 
the border in El Paso, if a regression analysis is conducted using San Diego, Laredo, and 
El Paso, an even greater correlation exists between distance and price; the adjusted R-
squared value is 0.548.  Thus, statistically, the distance cocaine travels to reach its 
various markets in the U.S. explains 54.8% of its price increase.  However, that means 
other factors exist that drive up the wholesale price of cocaine as it moves from its initial 
safe house to its final market, which must explain the other 45.2%. 
 
Table 2.   Regression Analysis for the San Diego, El Paso, and Laredo Borders.289 
                                                 
289 Data derived from 2008 “National Illicit Drug Prices.” 
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The second aspect of cocaine prices in the U.S. is the graphical depiction of a 
second, imaginary border.  A closer look at Figure 7 using both city prices and state 
averages, reveals a jump in price once cocaine is moved beyond the southwestern states.  
On Figure 7, the states are shaded to indicate higher wholesale price of cocaine.  
Additionally, cities with larger markers indicate higher cocaine prices.  Figure 7 indicates 
that once cocaine is moved beyond about 600 miles to 1,000 miles from its entry point, 
except for San Francisco and Houston, the price increases dramatically.  If an imaginary 
border does exist within the U.S., the causal factors could be numerous and would help 
explain the other 42.5% that distance cannot. 
Similar to the economics of value addition being the greatest along the route with 
the highest risk, Figure 7 depicts an area of high risk; moving drugs out of the southwest.  
It also depicts the lucrative reward for successfully shipping drugs to different parts of the 
U.S., especially to the northeast.  The southwest band of lower prices could be an 
indication of successful U.S. law enforcement anti-drug trafficking campaigns.  Or, it 
could be a reflection of policies within the U.S. working, and thus making it more 
challenging for traffickers to move drugs outside of the southwest.  Regardless of the 
reason for the price jump, the graphical depiction portrays another lucrative opportunity 
to entice DTOs to increase involvement in U.S. markets. 
To test the hypothesis of the imaginary border, I conducted another regression 
analysis using dummy variables (Table 3).  States within the imaginary border, or the 
Southwest U.S., were given a value of “0” for their distance.  These states were Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah.  All other states that were 
beyond the imaginary border were given a value of “1.”  However, the results of this 
statistical analysis produced a P-value of 0.139, meaning that this hypothesis is not 
statistically significant.  For this hypothesis to prove correct, a P-value less than one in 
twenty, or 0.05, needs to be produced.  Instead, this regression analysis, and its P-value, 
shows that the invisible border cannot be proven based on the given inputs, but that does 
not mean it does not exist.290 
                                                 




Table 3.   Regression Analysis for the Invisible Border and Other Entry Points.291 
These two discoveries, the correlation between distance and price and the 
theoretical invisible border, give even more reason that Mexican DTOs will continue to 
infiltrate the U.S. and attempt to control more of the supply chain process.  As DTOs 
expand their presence in the U.S. to capitalize on as much of these revenues as possible, 
American cities could begin to see an increase in drug related violence.  Additionally, by 
gaining a greater footprint north of the border and continuing their roles as entrepreneurs, 
cartels will uncover new opportunities within the deviant world.292  These aspects should 
be studied in more detail with future research. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I have three recommendations to help guide future policies and strategies of the 
U.S. government in regard to fighting the Mexican DTOs. 
1.  Fighting the drug cartels is an extremely challenging problem and should not 
be understated.  Mexican DTOs operate highly evolved, incentive based, and self-healing 
networks that can absorb major law-enforcement induced disruptions.  Time and time 
again, they prove their organizational resilience by quickly and efficiently shifting 
operations to alternate cells when required.  The U.S. must understand and respect the 
Mexican DTOs’ capabilities to bypass or overcome any policy or strategy it designs to 
disrupt their operations.  Any national policy or strategy that underestimates the drug 
cartels’ ability to strategize and execute will fail. 
2.  Most U.S. government and local organizations are organized in a hierarchical 
structure with multiple layers of bureaucracy, from federal entities all the way down to 
local law enforcement.  These layers of hierarchy force decisions, changes in plans, and 
communication to go through multiple decision makers or layers of approval, thus adding 
weeks and even months to a process.  When an organization does make a decision to 
execute an operation or make a change to policy, the DTOs quickly flex their network to 
overcome or circumvent the latest barrier.  This variation between DTO and government 
organization gives the cartels a significant advantage when it comes to adapting to 
changing environments.  The government will always be at a disadvantage when it is in 
an arms race against a flat organization because every strategic counter made by U.S. 
authorities requires several layers of approval and thus cannot keep up with the efficiency 
in which cartels and their contractors can adapt.  To overcome this impediment and level 
the playing field, the U.S. should move towards fighting these cartels with its own flat 
networks.293  To make this drastic change, law enforcement organizations that fight drug 
cartel activities should organize themselves so that more actors have autonomy to make 
real-time changes to plans, execute their own operations, and flex and adapt in a similar 
                                                 
293 This concept is derived from references and books by John Arquilla: Thomas A. Stewart, 
“America’s Secret Weapon,” Business 2.0, December 2001; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks 
and Netwars (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001).  
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manner to the cartels.  With this flatter structure, less emphasis should be placed on large, 
time-consuming, tangible projects or operations, such as advanced border fences or 
permanent inner-border checkpoints, because the DTOs have proven their ability to side 
step these types of barriers.  Instead, small law enforcement units should execute random, 
hard to predict activities that challenge the innovativeness of the cartels.  An example 
could be setting up a one to two day inner-border checkpoint at a new location to disrupt 
and confuse traffickers.  This activity would have similar results to random border 
inspections, but would decrease predictability by constantly changing positions within the 
U.S.  Most importantly, it would introduce confusion to the drug traffickers within the 
U.S. and would test the DTOs’ ability to flex and adapt in a region of which they focus 
more on efficiency and less on overcoming obstacles.  For example, in Chapter III I 
highlight the resilience of the contracting model that DTOs use to move illicit products 
across the border and into safe houses within the U.S.  To distribute drugs throughout the 
U.S., precautions are still taken to make it challenging for law enforcement to find the 
drugs stashed in vehicles or track suspicious movement, but more emphasis is placed on 
efficiency and less on overcoming challenging obstacles.  Random law enforcement 
activities within the U.S., such as the checkpoint example, would significantly inhibit the 
DTO activities because the focus of the traffickers in the U.S. is moving the product 
through the supply chain.  Thus, by using multiple, flat cells to fight the drug cartel 
activities, law enforcement can execute activities designed to confuse and disrupt the 
DTOs within the U.S. while also having the autonomy to quickly adapt to new tactics in a 
similar manner to the cartels so that they can cause confusion and disruption.  
3.  The war on drugs in the U.S. has been going on for over 40 years, and 
although that battle encompasses many aspects, such as policies, supply, demand, 
education, treatment, etc., drug cartels and their business activities continue to infiltrate 
our borders.  With regards to these illicit activities, the U.S. must reframe the problem.  
Most policies are designed with an end state of complete elimination of the drug cartels 
and their illicit activities from the U.S., however, as argued in this thesis, the Mexican 
DTO networks are too evolved and complex, and incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to 
dissolve.  Instead, the U.S. should shift its paradigm to target an end state that increases 
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the price of drugs.  For example, by making it more difficult and risky for traffickers to 
smuggle drugs into and throughout the US, the value of the drugs will continue to 
increase.  Higher prices will eventually push buyers out of the market and thus change the 
dynamic of the drug trade.  To accomplish this task, U.S. strategies should focus on the 
least expensive way to increase the price of drugs.   
Why the least expensive methods?  Because the U.S. is notorious for conducting 
operations or implementing projects that are high in cost, slow in production, and thus 
produce small returns on investment.  A way to overcome this would be to build on my 
second recommendation of using a small, flat organizational structure to combat the drug 
cartel activities.  For example, more autonomy and responsibility should be given to local 
organizations, such as local police, so that drug cartel activities become a bigger focus for 
these small law enforcement units.   
On an even smaller scale of participation, lessons can be taken from the U.S. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Red Balloon challenge, in 
which teams competed to find 10 red balloons placed randomly around the U.S.  The 
winning team found all 10 balloons in less than nine hours through crowd sourcing by 
incentivizing individuals to network on its behalf, which encouraged strangers to span 
their city blocks and then report balloon sightings through that network, as opposed to 
passing information to a competing team or not participating at all.294  To tie this 
challenge into increasing the risk associated with drug cartel activities and thus raising 
the price of drugs, the U.S. must think and act on a smaller scale that capitalizes on 
advances in communication and Internet connectivity.  If it could incentivize ways that 
everyday citizens could report suspicious drug related activities to law enforcement, the 
U.S. would be able to gather more intelligence and act quickly to disrupt these 
operations. Similar to how the drug cartels utilize bribes to stay one step ahead of 
                                                 
294 Larry Greenemeir, “Inflated Expectations: Crowd-Sourcing Comes of Age in the DARPA 
Network Challenge,” Scientific American, December 21, 2009, 
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authorities in Mexico, the U.S. could do something similar within its borders.  It just has 
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VI. LIST OF TABLES295 
Cocaine Average Price in US Dollars 
  
2008 City Averages 2008 State Averages 












  Alabama Birmingham $21,250 $1,000 $105 $20,750 $950 $106 
Mobile $20,000 $1,000 $110       
Montgomery $21,000 $850 $103       
Arizona 
Phoenix $16,750 n/a 
120/ 
.125oz $16,250 $675   
Tucson $15,750 $675         
Arkansas Fayetteville $16,000     $18,667 $800 $95 
Fort Smith $19,000 $800 $100       
Little Rock $21,000 $800 $90       
California Fresno $16,250     $17,650 $700 $77 
Los Angeles $18,000 $700 $80       
Sacramento $17,500 $750 $100       
San Diego $16,000 $650 $50       
San Francisco $20,500 $700 n/a       
Colorado Colorado Springs $20,000 $750 $75 $20,375 $775 $93 
Denver $20,750 $800 $110       
Connecticut Bridgeport $27,000 $975   $28,000 $942 $44 
Hartford $27,000 $900 $43       
New Haven $30,000 $950 $45       
Delaware Wilmington $28,000 $1,050 $125 $28,000 $1,050 $125 
DC District of 
Columbia $30,000 $1,225 $125 $30,000 $1,225 $125 
Florida Jacksonville $21,500 $850 $80 $19,594 $844 $81 
Miami $16,375 $950 $100       
Orlando $21,000 $775 $90       
Tampa $19,500 $800 $53       
Georgia Atlanta $21,750 n/a $45 $21,313   $76 
Columbus $24,000   $70       
Macon $20,000   $90       
Savannah $19,500   $100       
Idaho Boise $19,000 $700 $63 $19,000 $700 $63 
Illinois Chicago $24,000 $825 $150 $23,833 $883 $117 
Rockford $21,500 $775 $100       
Springfield $26,000 $1,050 $100       
  
                                                 
295 The tables listed in this section were derived from 2008 “National Illicit Drug Prices.”  Distances 
were calculated using Google Maps. 
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Indiana Indianapolis $21,500 $900 $90 $20,875 $863 $87 
Evansville $20,000 $800 $90       
Fort Wayne $20,000 $900 $78       
Merrillville $22,000 $850 $90       
Iowa Cedar Rapids $24,000 $1,100 $100 $24,000 $1,013 $110 
Des Moines   $925 $120       
Kansas Wichita $28,000 $700 $90 $28,000 $700 $90 
Kentucky Lexington $25,000 $900 $100 $24,250 $888 $100 
Louisville $23,500 $875         
Louisiana Baton Rouge   $1,000 $100 $22,000 $800 $105 
Shreveport $22,500 $800 $100       
New Orleans $21,500 $600 $115       
Maine Bangor   $1,450 $90 $33,250 $1,300 $83 
Lewiston $31,500 $1,200 $88       
Portland $35,000 $1,250 $70       
Maryland Baltimore $28,000 $1,050 $125 $26,500 $1,138 $125 
Hagerstown $25,000 $1,225 $125       
Massachusetts Springfield $29,000 $1,075 $29 $26,750 $1,075 $46 
Worcester $24,500   $55       
Boston $26,750 n/a $55       
Michigan Detroit $26,500 $1,125 $85 $23,667 $992 $83 
Grand Rapids $22,000 $950         
Saginaw $22,500 $900 $80       
Minnesota Minneapolis $20,500 $950 $100 $20,500 $950 $100 
Mississippi Gulfport $22,500 $950 $100 $21,667 $850 $100 
Jackson $20,500 $750 $100       
Oxford $22,000 $850 $100       
Missouri Kansas City $20,000 $1,000 $90 $26,500 $1,100 $95 
St. Louis $33,000 $1,200 $100       
Montana Billings $30,000 $1,850 $113 $35,000 $1,713 $113 
Great Falls $40,000 $1,575 $113       
Nebraska Omaha $20,500 $925 n/a $20,500 $925   
Nevada Las Vegas $16,000 $799 $90 $15,100 $725 $70 
Reno $14,200 $650 $50       
New 
Hampshire Manchester $30,250 $1,000 $97 $30,250 $1,000 $97 
New Jersey Atlantic City $28,500 $1,150 $75 $27,833 $958 $57 
Camden $29,500 $975 $58       
Newark $25,500 $750 $38       
New Mexico Albuquerque $17,000 $600 $90 $16,375 $600 $90 
Las Cruces $15,750 $600 $90       
New York Albany $27,500 $1,175 $100 $27,167 $1,075 $74 
Buffalo $26,500 $1,125 $70       





Charlotte $21,500 $850 $70 $23,688 $906 $64 
Greensboro $24,000 $800 $50       
Raleigh $25,000 $975 $75       
Wilmington $24,250 $1,000 $60       
North Dakota Bismarck $27,500 $1,600 $175 $23,750 $1,625 $175 
Fargo $20,000 $1,650 $175       
Ohio Cincinnati $26,000 $938 $100 $26,167 $1,090 $100 
Cleveland $25,000 $1,050 $100       
Columbus $22,500 $1,000 $100       
Dayton $23,500 $1,000 $100       
Toledo $29,000 $1,200 $100       
Youngstown $31,000 $1,350 $100       
Oklahoma Oklahoma City $20,000 $700 $90 $20,000 $825 $90 
Tulsa $20,000 $950 $90       
Oregon Eugene $18,500 $900 $70 $19,000 $850 $80 
Portland $19,500 $800 $90       
Pennsylvania Allentown $25,000 $875 $33 $25,167 $900 $85 
Philadelphia $27,000 $925 $85       
Pittsburg $23,500   $138       
Rhode Island Providence $30,000 $950 $34 $30,000 $950 $34 
South 
Carolina 
Charleston $24,000 $925 $75 $22,750 $897 $86 
Columbia $23,000 $963 $135       
Florence $20,500 $800 $50       
Greenville $23,500 $900 $85       
South Dakota Rapid City   $1,500 $110 $16,500 $1,275 $108 
Sioux Falls $16,500 $1,050 $105       
Tennessee Knoxville $22,500 $1,050   $20,500 $892 $53 
Memphis $23,750 $775 $55       
Nashville $15,250 $850 $50       
Texas Alpine $17,250 $550 $200 $17,586 $670 $114 
Dallas $18,350 $775 $65       
El Paso $16,750 $515 $60       
Galveston $17,500 $950 $100       
Houston $20,500 $800 $80       
Midland $17,250 $550 $200       
San Antonio $15,500 $550 $90       
Utah Salt Lake City $17,000 $575 $70 $17,000 $575 $70 
Vermont Burlington $31,500 $1,250 $90 $31,500 $1,250 $90 
Virginia Fairfax $26,000 $1,000 $100 $26,300 $900 $96 
Norfolk $27,500 $1,000 $100       
Richmond $25,500 $700 $80       
Roanoke $26,000   $100       
Virginia Beach $26,500   $100       
  
 110 
Washington Seattle $18,500 $688 $65 $19,000 $679 $65 
Spokane $18,500 $750 $70       
Yakima $20,000 $600 $60       
West Virginia Charleston $22,500 $800 $150 $22,500 $800 $150 
Wisconsin Green Bay $22,500 $1,150 $113 $21,667 $1,042 $101 
Madison $20,000 $975 $88       
Milwaukee $22,500 $1,000 $103       
Wyoming Cheyenne $27,500 $1,750 $163 $27,500 $1,750 $163 
 




Cocaine Wholesale Price State Average and Distance from Border 
  
Distance (miles)        



















Paso Laredo State Capital Difference 
Alabama $20,750 2013 1282 947 Montgomery $23,629 $2,879 
Arizona $16,250 363 430 1036 Phoenix $16,329 $79 
Arkansas $18,667 1684 954 749 Little Rock $22,173 $3,506 
California $17,650 518 1184 1790 Sacramento $17,014 -$636 
Colorado $20,375 1090 635 1096 Denver $19,545 -$830 
Connecticut $28,000 2936 2305 2066 Hartford $27,712 -$288 
Delaware $28,000 2794 2063 1824 Dover $27,084 -$916 
DC $30,000 2693 1962 1724 DC $26,637 -$3,363 
Florida $19,594 2183 1452 1023 Tallahassee $24,381 $4,787 
Georgia $21,313 2147 1416 1107 Atlanta $24,222 $2,909 
Idaho $19,000 966 1201 1714 Boise $18,996 -$4 
Illinois $23,833 1955 1322 1154 Springfield $23,372 -$461 
Indiana $20,875 2101 1468 1329 Indianapolis $24,018 $3,143 
Iowa $24,000 1757 1132 1164 Des Moines $22,496 -$1,504 
Kansas $28,000 1549 880 912 Topeka $21,576 -$6,424 
Kentucky $24,250 2172 1506 1300 Frankfort $24,332 $82 
Louisiana $22,000 1745 1015 585 Baton Rouge $22,443 $443 
Maine $33,250 3207 2551 2313 Augusta $28,911 -$4,339 
Maryland $26,500 2732 2002 1763 Annapolis $26,810 $310 
Massachusetts $26,750 3051 2396 2157 Boston $28,221 $1,471 
Michigan $23,667 2290 1711 1580 Lansing $24,854 $1,188 
Minnesota $20,500 2004 1380 1412 Saint Paul $23,589 $3,089 
Mississippi $21,667 1769 1039 756 Jackson $22,549 $882 
Missouri $26,500 1781 1148 980 Jefferson City $22,602 -$3,898 
Montana $35,000 1244 1345 1861 Helena $20,226 -$14,774 
Nebraska $20,500 1572 961 1055 Lincoln $21,678 $1,178 
Nevada $15,100 537 1167 1773 Carson City $17,098 $1,998 
New 
Hampshire $30,250 3027 2451 2212 Concord $28,115 -$2,135 
New Jersey $27,833 2764 2141 1902 Trenton $26,951 -$882 
New Mexico $16,375 882 328 772 Santa Fe $18,625 $2,250 
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New York $27,167 2883 2282 2077 Albany $27,478 $311 
North Carolina $23,688 2553 1822 1513 Raleigh $26,018 $2,330 
North Dakota $23,750 1726 1339 1560 Bismarck $22,359 -$1,391 
Ohio $26,167 2275 1674 1469 Columbus $24,788 -$1,379 
Oklahoma 
$20,000 1362 730 622 
Oklahoma 
City $20,748 $748 
Oregon $19,000 1053 1718 2186 Salem $19,381 $381 
Pennsylvania $25,167 2643 2017 1779 Harrisburg $26,416 $1,249 
Rhode Island $30,000 3009 2363 2124 Providence $28,035 -$1,965 
South Carolina $22,750 2361 1630 1315 Columbia $25,168 $2,418 
South Dakota $16,500 1611 1161 1322 Pierre $21,850 $5,350 
Tennessee $20,500 2029 1200 1093 Nashville $23,699 $3,199 
Texas $17,586 1307 576 235 Austin $20,505 $2,919 
Utah 
$17,000 763 864 1377 
Salt Lake 
City $18,098 $1,098 
Vermont $31,500 3018 2417 2212 Montpelier $28,075 -$3,425 
Virginia $26,300 2642 1911 1638 Richmond $26,412 $112 
Washington $19,000 1210 1733 2246 Olympia $20,076 $1,076 
West Virginia $22,500 2363 1685 1480 Charleston $25,177 $2,677 
Wisconsin $21,667 2050 1425 1418 Madison $23,792 $2,126 
Wyoming $27,500 1175 736 1143 Cheyenne $19,921 -$7,579 
 
Table 5.   State Averages of Cocaine and Distance from the Border 
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